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Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability
Over the past quarter century, the concept of “adaptive
preferences” has played an important role in debates in law,
economics, and political philosophy. As Professor Jon Elster has
described this psychological phenomenon, “people tend to adjust
their aspirations to their possibilities.”1 A number of prominent
scholars have argued that the existence of adaptive preferences
“raises serious problems for neoclassical economics and for
unambivalent enthusiasm for freedom of choice.”2 Because our
current preferences are constrained by the opportunities available
to us, proponents of adaptive preference theory contend, those
preferences may not be the best guide to what is in our interests;
we may be unduly content with unfair limitations on our
opportunities. In a typical passage, Amartya Sen describes the
phenomenon this way:
The underdog learns to bear the burden so well that
he or she overlooks the burden itself. Discontent is
replaced by acceptance, hopeless rebellion by
conformist quiet, and—most relevantly in the
present context—suffering and anger by cheerful
endurance. As people learn to adjust to the existing
horrors by the sheer necessity of uneventful
survival, the horrors look less terrible in the metric
of utilities.3

1 JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 109
(1983).
2 Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J.
385, 426 (2004). For examples of scholars making similar points, see ELSTER,
SOUR GRAPES, supra note 1, at 137; MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 111-166 (2000); AMARTYA SEN,
COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 14-15 (1987) (Oxford India Paperback 1999);
David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 351, 375-377
(2002); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129, 1150 (1986).

AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT 309 (1984). This
general notion clearly is related to the Marxian notion of “false consciousness,”
but it also draws on a more liberal tradition. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at 114-115; see, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL,
UTILITARIANISM 10 (George Sher, ed., 1979) (1861) (“It is better to be a human
being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a
fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because
they only know their own side of the question.”).
3
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Thus, scholars have typically invoked the adaptive preferences
phenomenon as an argument that some (specified) preferences are
not a proper measure of justice and ought not to guide policy.4
Although some have recognized in the abstract5 that nothing in the
theory of adaptive preferences requires preferences to be uniformly
disregarded, the concept has nearly always been deployed by the
theory’s adherents as part of an argument for disregarding
revealed, expressed, or felt preferences.6
Critics of adaptive preference theory have argued that the
theory lacks “both conceptual coherence and empirical
grounding,”7 and that it is “undemocratic,”8 because the true
“argument for respecting preferences is that they are the
individual’s, whatever their origin.”9 We take a different tack. We
agree with the theory’s proponents that adaptive preferences exist
and that they raise significant normative questions about the
unreflective use of preferences as a measure of justice or a basis for
policy. But—and this is a point to which proponents of adaptive
preference theory have given too little attention—identifying
adaptive preferences is only the beginning of the normative
inquiry. Although the writings of the theory’s proponents suggest
4 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at
144; SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES, supra note 2, at 14-15; SEN, RESOURCES,
VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 309. Elster distinguishes adaptive
preferences (which result from “habituation and resignation”) from preferences
developed through learning or conscious character planning. ELSTER, supra note
1, at 112-114, 117-119. But other exponents of the adaptive preference theory use
the term more broadly. See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 2, at 136-138 (discussing Elster).
5 See, e.g., NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 2, at
137 (arguing that “it is not clear that [Jon Elster] should in a sweeping way
condemn adaptive preferences” because sometimes it makes sense to encourage
adaptation).
6 For a rare instance of a law review article (albeit not one by scholars
associated with the adaptive preference theory) arguing that it might be
inappropriate to disregard adaptive preferences, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 619-620 (2003)
(arguing that if preferences adapt to a “postcrisis baseline” that restricts liberty to
protect against terror threats, that adaptation will be a good thing “if the
precrisis baseline represented a society underprepared for emergencies, in which
law and institutions were supplying too much liberty and not enough order”).
7 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 143-149 (2003).
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Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Liberalism Versus Classical Liberalism, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 672 (2004).
8

9

(2002).

LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS
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the contrary, we argue that adaptive preferences ought not be
automatically rejected (though neither should they be uncritically
accepted) as a measure of justice or a basis for policy. Rather, the
realization that particular preferences are adaptive should induce
a more searching normative inquiry into whether those
preferences ought to drive policy in particular contexts. We
illustrate this point by exploring one area in which, far from
ignoring adaptive preferences, the law should embrace and
promote them. That area is what has been dubbed “the rapidly
bubbling cauldron”10 of hedonic damages in tort.
Hedonic damages compensate for the lost enjoyment of life
that results from a tortious injury. Those damages are usually
considered to go beyond traditional pain and suffering or mental
anguish damages. Pain and suffering damages traditionally
compensate “for the physical discomfort and the emotional
response to the sensation of pain caused by the injury itself,” and
mental anguish damages traditionally compensate for “shock,
fright, emotional upset, and/or humiliation” caused by the tort.”11
Hedonic damages, by contrast, compensate for limitations “on the
injured person’s ability to participate in and derive pleasure from
the normal activities of daily life, or for the individual’s inability to
pursue his talents, recreational interests, hobbies, or avocations.”12
A number of states recognize hedonic damages as a
separate category of recovery in tort and tort-like actions.13 Others
consider lost enjoyment of life an aspect of what are sometimes
termed “disability” damages—damages for physical or mental
impairment.14 Many other states permit juries to take account of
10 Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly
Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037 (2004); see generally Brendan I.
Koerner, What’s Your Happiness Worth?, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 56
(discussing recent controversy over hedonic damages).
11

Boan v. Blackwell, 541 S.E.2d 242, 244 (S.C. 2001).

12

Boan, 541 S.E.2d at 244.

See, e.g., Boan, 541 S.E.2d at 245; Adams v. Miller, 908 S.W.2d 112, 116,
(Ky. 1995), abrogated in part on other grounds, Giuliani v. Guiler, 951 S.W.2d 318
(Ky. 1997); Fantozzi v. Sandusky Cement Prod. Co., 597 N.E.2d 474, 486 (Ohio
1992); McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 375-377 (N.Y. 1989); Swiler v.
Barker’s Super Market, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Neb. 1979).
13

14 See, e.g., Swiler v. Baker’s Super Market, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Neb.
1979) (“Loss of enjoyment of life may, in a particular case, flow from a disability
and be simply a part thereof, and where the evidence supports it, may be argued
to the jury.”); Anderson v. Nebraska Dep’t of Social Services, 538 N.W. 2d 732,
740 (Neb. 1995) (“[L]oss of enjoyment of life is not a separate category of damages
but is an element or component of pain and suffering and of disability.”); Knight
v. Lord, 648 N.E.2d 617, 623 (Ill. App. 1995) (loss of enjoyment of life is an aspect
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lost enjoyment of life in setting compensation for pain and
suffering15 or other forms of general damages.16 In all these
jurisdictions,17 disability has loomed large. And the view of
disability is often one of tragic dependency and helplessness. As
we show in Part I below, lawyers seeking hedonic damages
emphasize their clients’ new status as compromised and damaged
persons, and courts frequently uphold jury verdicts awarding
hedonic damages to individuals who experienced disabling injuries
based on a view that disability—what some courts refer to as the
failure to be a “whole person”18—necessarily limits one’s enjoyment
of life.
This view is consonant with a general societal
understanding of disability as a tragedy and of people with
disabilities as natural objects of pity.
In this article, we challenge that view. A rich psychological
literature demonstrates that disability does not inherently limit
enjoyment of life to the degree that these courts suggest. Rather,
people who experience disabling injuries tend to adapt to their
disabilities.19 To the extent that they experience continuing
hedonic loss, it is physical pain, loss of societal opportunities, and
of disability damages, or damages for “loss of a normal life”). See Pamela J.
Hermes, Loss of Enjoyment of Life—Duplication of Damages Versus Full
Compensation, 63 N.D. L. REV. 561, 577-80 (1987).
15 See, e.g., Estate of Pearson v. Interstate Power & Light Co., 700 N.W.2d
333, 347 (Iowa 2005); Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 102 P.3d 52, 64 (Nev. 2004);
Gregory v. Carey, 791 P.2d 1329, 1336 (Kan. 1990); Canfield v. Sandock, 563
N.E.2d 1279, 1281-1283 (Ind. 1990).

Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Ind. 1990) (holding loss of
enjoyment of life a proper part of general compensation for personal injury)
16

17 On the division of jurisdictions into these or similar groupings, see Ronald
J. Mishkin, Comment, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as an Element of Damages, 73
DICK. L. REV. 639 (1969); Carleton Robert Cramer, Note, Loss of Enjoyment of Life
as a Separate Element of Damages, 12 PAC. L.J. 965 (1981); Gretchen L.
Valentine, Comment, Hedonic Damages: Emerging Issue in Personal Injury and
Wrongful Death Claims, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 577 (1990); Pamela J. Hermes, Loss
of Enjoyment of Life-Duplication of Damages Versus Full Compensation, 63 N.D.
L. REV. 561, 565 (1987); Annotation, Loss of Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct
Element or Factor in Awarding Damages for Bodily Injury, 34 A.L.R. 4th 293
(1984). For a general discussion of the case law both in states that allow a
separate recovery for hedonic damages and in states that allow recovery for
hedonic damages as part of a broader noneconomic damages category, see Susan
Poser, Brian H. Bornstein, & E. Kiernan McGorty, Measuring Damages for Lost
Enjoyment of Life: The View From the Bench and the Jury Box, 27 L. & HUM.
BEHAVIOR 53, 54-57 (2003).
18

E.g., Flannery v. United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 436 (W.Va. 1982).

For a recent personal account of the adaptation process, see William J.
Stuntz, Pain Principle, NEW REPUB., Sept. 11 & 18, 2006, at 8.
19
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social stigma—not anything inherent in the disability—that is the
major contributor.
Unfortunately, people without disabilities have a difficult
time imagining that disability can do anything other than
drastically impair the enjoyment of life. Studies have consistently
shown that nondisabled people rate the quality of life with a
disability as being significantly lower than people with disabilities
rate the quality of their own lives. The extensive psychological
literature on affective forecasting—recently brought to a mass
audience in Daniel Gilbert’s book Stumbling on Happiness20—
demonstrates that this phenomenon is no fluke. People simply do
a poor job of
predicting how they will feel in new life
circumstances. People without disabilities may expect that a
disabling injury will be tragic, but people who have such injuries
tend not to experience them that way.21
To be sure, the views of people with disabilities about their
own quality of life are classic adaptive preferences. Accordingly,
one might suggest that the legal system should disregard those
views.22 But we argue that the legal system goes wrong by so
20 DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006).
For a recent
comprehensive effort to assess the implications of the affective forecasting
literature for the law, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The
Problem of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005). (In a paragraph,
Blumenthal notes that the affective forecasting literature might have
implications for hedonic damages, but he does not develop the point. See id. at
184.) For other recent examples of legal applications of the affective forecasting
literature, see Chris Guthrie, Risk Realization, Emotion, and Policy Making, 69
MO. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1044 (2004); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93
The recent proposals for “asymmetric” or
GEO. L.J. 1, 116-119 (2004).
“libertarian” paternalism also respond to a significant extent to problems of
affective forecasting.
See generally Colin Camerer, et al., Regulation for
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,”
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). Edward
McCaffery, Daniel Kahneman, and Matthew Spitzer discussed some of the
possible implications of adaptive preferences theory for tort law in a more general
way in Edward J. McCaffery, Daniel J. Kahneman & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA.
L. REV. 1341, 1388-1403 (1995).
21 For ease of expression, we speak here in generalities about the basic
tendencies of the two groups; the views of individuals within each group are
obviously heterogeneous. We discuss that point below in Parts III.D. and III.E.
22 See JOHN MCKIE, PETER SINGER, HELGA KUHSE & JEFF RICHARDSON, THE
ALLOCATION OF HEALTH CARE RESOURCES: AN ETHICAL EVALUATION OF THE ‘QALY’
APPROACH 34 (1998) (arguing that hedonic adaptation by people with disabilities
should not be used in determining their quality of life).
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devaluing the experience of people with disabilities. When courts
award damages based on the (nondisabled person’s) view that
disability is tragic, they distract attention from the societal choices
and stigmas that attach disadvantage to disability; they also make
it harder for people with disabilities to make hedonic adjustments
to their conditions. For deterrence and compensation reasons,
people who experience disabling injuries should be able to recover
for their physical pain; for medical expenses and the cost of
assistive technology and personal assistance; for the opportunities
society denies people with their conditions; and for the effects of
social stigma. But they should not recover for any purported effect
of disability on the enjoyment of life.
We thus hope to contribute to the tort-law literature on
hedonic damages, as well as the wider literature on adaptive
preferences. Our intervention in these debates may also be
regarded as an effort at what Jerry Kang has called “behavioral
realism,” an interdisciplinary collaboration that seeks “to deepen
our understanding of human behavior generally and [the
mechanics of intergroup inequality] specifically, with an eye
toward practical solutions.”23 Our argument proceeds as follows.
In Part I, we show that lawyers presenting hedonic damages cases
and courts hearing those cases have treated disability as
inherently and tragically limiting the ability to enjoy life. In Part
II, we review the extensive evidence, developed by psychologists
and rehabilitation professionals, that people with disabilities tend
not to believe that their disabilities limit the ability to enjoy life,
but that people without disabilities have a much more pessimistic
view. Courts that award hedonic damages for disabling injuries
thus tend to act based on the views of most people without
disabilities, rather than on the views of most people with them.
Finally, in Part III, we develop in detail the normative
implications. We argue that courts should not award hedonic
damages based on disability.
We should note at the outset the limits of our argument.
The hedonic damages in which we are interested constitute
compensation for what is said to be the shrunken pleasure of living
with a disability, compared to the plaintiff’s prior physical or
mental state. We are not dealing, at least not here and not
directly, with two related but distinct topics: “disability damages”

23

(2005).

Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1591-1592
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that are not based on the effect of disability on life’s enjoyment,24
and hedonic damages for the complete loss of the ability to
experience life (because of death or coma, for example).25 The
former class of damages may implicate some of the same
normative issues we highlight with regard to hedonic damages, but
because they do not implicate the problem of hedonic adaptation
we do not discuss them further. With respect to the latter, hedonic
damages in wrongful death cases or cases of coma or vegetative
state serve the function of placing a significant value on the
deprivation of all of life’s experiences. Because the plaintiffs or
decedents cannot perceive the awards, those cases are more about
deterrence than compensation.26 More important for this project,
they do not relate to any adaptive preferences of their victims, who
do not have the ability to sustain any preferences at all.
I. DISABILITY AND HEDONIC DAMAGES PRACTICE
Our goal in this Part is largely descriptive. We show that
when lawyers seek, and courts award, hedonic damages, they often
treat disability as something that inherently (or nearly so) impairs
not only plaintiffs’ physical or mental activity, but also their
enjoyment of life. In Section A, we examine how plaintiffs’ lawyers
themselves advise their colleagues to argue for hedonic damages in
cases involving disabling injuries. In Section B, we examine the
discourse in courts that have upheld hedonic damages awards in
such cases. This description sets the stage for our discussion in
Part II of the psychological research, which shows that people with
disabilities in fact do not tend to believe that their disabilities limit
their life’s enjoyment in the ways lawyers and courts suggest.

24 As we have noted, see supra note 14, disability damages are sometimes
awarded for hedonic harm. Our argument applies in full to that class of disability
damages.
25 On hedonic damages in cases arising out of deadly accidents, see, e.g., Eric
A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 545
(2005) (noting that five states permit recovery for hedonic loss in wrongful death
actions); Andrew J. McClurg, It’s a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic
Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1990). On hedonic
damages when the plaintiff has been rendered unable to experience anything, see,
e.g., McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989) (holding some degree of
cognitive awareness as prerequisite to recovery of damages for loss of enjoyment
of life); Eyoma v. Falco, 589 A.2d 653, 662 (N.J. Super 1991) (allowing recovery
for lost enjoyment of life by plaintiff in a vegetative state).
26 We have no quarrel with that function of hedonic damages, although their
deterrent effect should not be overstated, see Margo Schlanger, Second Best
Damage Action Deterrence, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 517, 530-531 (2006).
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A. The Practices of Plaintiffs’ Lawyers
In personal injury cases, hedonic damages can be an
important component of plaintiffs’ claims. Materials written by
and for plaintiffs’ lawyers demonstrate that counsel in such cases
aim to arouse the pity of jurors by emphasizing a great distance
between “normal” and disabled life. Lawyers advise their fellows
to paint a picture of injury as permanent disability accompanied
inevitably (that is, through no fault of the plaintiff) by debilitation
and
dependence
(and—over
and
over
again—hygienic
difficulties).27
A few examples will suffice to give the basic flavor of these
materials. The first is a sample closing argument in a case in
which the plaintiff with impaired vision in one eye lost the vision
in the other eye due to the alleged medical malpractice of the
defendant. (The references to a computer are intended to shore up
the jury’s responsibility for deriving a dollar figure without expert
assistance):
You have to consider past and future loss of
life’s pleasures. You have to award Paul for that.
You heard the testimony. A computer doesn’t know
what it’s like to want to play a game of cards with
the guys down the block. A computer doesn’t know
what it’s like to have someone say, “Pop Pop, do you
want to catch a ball?” . . . Imagine you need to go for
a haircut or to go visit your relatives, and to realize
that you are a prisoner. You have to ask your wife
“will you drive me down for the haircut, will you
wait outside for the haircut, and when I’m done will
you take me home” Or consider that this time of year
you want to do some Christmas shipping. You can’t
go to the mall. You can’t go out and take a walk
around the neighborhood. You can’t even buy a gift
for someone because you have to ask your wife to
take you.
A computer doesn’t know what it’s like to be a
man and you go to a wedding or you go to a first
communion or a bar mitzvah, and when you have to

On the disability rights movement’s rejection of this portrayal, and its
implications for hedonic damages, see infra text accompanying notes 142-152.
27
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go to the bathroom you have to say, “Will you take
me, Karen?”28
A leading practitioners’ treatise similarly advises lawyers
seeking hedonic damages for disabling injuries to turn the trial
into a maudlin spectacle that aims at demonstrating that the
plaintiff’s “life has no dignity”:
Have [the plaintiff’s husband] describe their
family, to which he will readily respond that his
spouse was the center of a typical American family.
They did all of the normal things that any family
would do, together. As a family, they went out to
dinner or the movies. They enjoyed planning and
taking vacations. His wife always took the
photographs and made the family scrapbook. She
was an excellent homemaker and cook, but more
importantly a wonderful mother. She lived to do
things with their daughter. She had always dreamed
of having a daughter so that she could do the same
things with her daughter that her mother had done
with her. She got her wish and her daughter was her
joy. The husband explains that his wife and
daughter had an excellent relationship. They talked
about everything. They were each other’s best friend.
You then call the daughter, who, with
courage, describes her relationship with her mother.
Her testimony, although brief, less than 15 minutes,
is poignant. Unsurprisingly, there is no crossexamination. The daughter tells the jury how happy
her mother was the week before the injury, that she
was on school break and they could decorate her
room together. Her mother was a problem solver,
willing to help with school issues and willing to step
in and intervene or advise on problems with friends.
Together they worked on jigsaw puzzles, played
cards, made candy, went shopping, enjoyed lunch
and through everything, they talked. This was a
“girl thing” between a mother and daughter, two
women. They basically did everything together.
These are the relationships and activity patterns

Thomas Duffy, A Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Perspective, in MEDICAL-LEGAL
ASPECTS OF PAIN AND SUFFERING 483, 485-96 (Patricia Iyer, ed. 2003).
28
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that the injured mother had established as her
normal life prior to injury.
This testimony will stand in marked contrast
to the medical care providers who will testify that
plaintiff is incapable of doing any of the things her
husband and daughter described, and is unable to
perform any of the normal, everyday activities of life.
She can’t comb her hair or bathe herself. She must
ring a bell to relieve her bladder. A woman who
loved to cook is now fed through a gastrostomy tube.
All of the simple mundane aspects of daily life, that
we take for granted and that comprise our normal
lives, she is no longer capable of performing. Her life
has no dignity. 29
Understandably enough, the entire presentation of
evidence—indeed, the entire development of evidence—is aimed at
consolidating this image and rejecting any more sanguine
assessment of the plaintiff’s life prospects. The same treatise
suggests, for example:
If a physician describes a “moderate” loss, have him
or her explain it on a scale of mild, moderate, and
severe. Stress that the physician is someone who
deals with disabled persons every day.
It is
moderate compared to the few who have severe
injuries, but devastating in contrast to the
individual who has no disabilities. The individual
with a limp may be consoled by the person confined
to a wheelchair, but is still frustrated, self-conscious
and feels inadequate when
observing the
overwhelming majority of people who walk without
any impediment whatsoever.30
Practitioners stress that plaintiffs themselves can often
undermine their own cases. One lawyer writes, “Plaintiffs also
tend to understate their condition in the [day-in-a-life] diary with
notations of ‘good’ or ‘not bad today.’ This is somewhat ironic
considering that clients are often making these notations while
confined to a wheelchair or bed.”31 And the same treatise chapter
29 Philip H. Corboy & Susan J. Schwartz, Pain and Suffering and NonEconomic Damages, in ATLA’S LITIGATING TORT CLAIMS § 24:13 (Roxanne Barton
Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano, eds., 2006).
30

Id. at § 24.17.

31

Duffy, supra note 28, at 487.
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quoted above counsels: “In developing the testimony you will
ultimately present on the issue of noneconomic damages, you may
find that the plaintiff is not the best, and certainly not the only,
witness who should discuss these damages. After all, the plaintiff
lives with his or her injuries on a daily basis and has learned to
compensate for his or her limitations.”32 Thus lawyers are advised
to override their clients’ own claims of adjustment, coping, and
adaptation.
For this reason and to avoid the plaintiff seeming like a
whiner, plaintiffs’ lawyers frequently advise that the plaintiff not
even attend the trial. Instead, says one experienced trial lawyer,
plaintiff’s counsel should inform the jury:
‘With the court’s permission and pursuant to the
recommendation of the treating physician, John Doe
will not be present in the courtroom except when
providing testimony, if at all.’ This lends apparent
judicial approval to the plaintiff’s absence. It also
subtly declares that the plaintiff’s injuries are so
incapacitating that the rigors of a trial are beyond
plaintiff’s abilities.33
The point is that plaintiffs’ counsel litigate personal injury
cases to emphasize to both the defendant (for settlement) and the
jury that plaintiffs’ injuries are permanently disabling and
devastating in their effect on plaintiffs’ dignity and quality of life—
that their injuries have caused plaintiffs, inevitably and through
no fault of their own, sharp contraction in their personal agency
and activity, and, consequently, in their enjoyment of life.
B. The Judicial Discourse
The same frame characterizes judicial decisionmaking in
the cases. Consider a 1967 California case, in which the plaintiff,
a conductor-brakeman for a railroad, had both legs severed. The
court sustained a large damages award on two alternative bases.
The award, the court said, was fully supportable as economic
damages (for lost wages, rehabilitation costs, and the like). But in
addition, it was reasonable in light of the plaintiff’s hedonic
damages:
At the time of respondent’s injury he was 29.7 years
of age. The fruitful and productive years of his life
32

Corboy & Schwartz, supra note 29, at § 24.10

33

WILLIAM A. BARTON, RECOVERING FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INJURIES 176 (2d ed.

1990).

-11-

DRAFT—DO NOT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHORS

were before him. In the accident he lost both legs
high above the knees. His right stump is only three
and three-quarters inches in length, his left one four
inches. There was evidence that he will never be
able to use functional artificial legs; that he will be
confined to a wheelchair for the remainder of his
days; that he will require personal assistance in the
routine affairs of living, and will never be able to
hold gainful employment of a significant nature. In
sum, so far as the expected pleasures and
satisfactions of life are concerned he has become a
mere spectator and is no longer a participant.34
In many cases upholding hedonic damages awards judges
seem to have concluded, explicitly, that the mere fact of disability,
without more, necessarily limits life’s enjoyment. In one early
case, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court upheld a damages award
on the ground that “[t]he total loss of the left hand by a boy 10
years of age takes a great deal of usefulness and enjoyment out of
his prospective life.”35 Although the court stated that “[t]he loss of
earning power is by no means the extent of the injury,”36 it did not
elaborate on how the absence of a left hand deprived the plaintiff’s
life of “usefulness and enjoyment.”37 Similarly, in a 1925 case, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed a plaintiff’s verdict,
explaining without development: “A shriveled hand and wrist is a
mortification especially to a young woman, such as Mrs. Haeussler
was. She is entitled to compensation for the mortification. Such
an injury also deprives one of much of the enjoyment of life.”38 In a
far more recent case, in holding that hedonic damages could be
recovered as part of an award for permanent impairment, the New
Hampshire Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the inability to
engage in pleasurable activities “is the natural result of the
incapacity that an impairment award is designed to compensate.”39
Hedonic damages thus were part and parcel of the permanent
impairment award, which “compensates the victim for the inability
34

Henninger v. Southern Pac. Co., 59 Cal.Rptr. 76, 84 (Cal. App. 1967)

35

Haynes v. Waterville & O. St. Ry., 64 A. 614, 615 (Me. 1906).

36

Id.

Cf. King v. Britt, 148 S.E.2d 594, 598 (N.C. 1966) (ruling that the jury
could “infer and find that the permanent scar on appellant’s forehead caused her
to suffer mental pain” even though the appellant “did not testify that she suffered
any mental pain or anguish or embarrassment or humiliation”).
37

38

Haeussler v. Consolidated Stone & Sand Co., 127 A. 602, 604 (N.J. 1925).

39

Bennett v. Lembo, 761 A.2d 494, 498 (N.H. 2000).

-12-

DRAFT—DO NOT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHORS

to function as a ‘whole person.’”40 Other courts have similarly
suggested that individuals with disabilities inevitably experience
hedonic loss because they can no longer “function as a whole
man.”41
The language of wholeness, which appears with some
regularity in the caselaw,42 is a classic linguistic devaluation of life
with a disability; other similar signals—use of the words “normal”
or “crippled”—are common as well. Some cases, for example,
characterize hedonic damages as recovery of damages for “loss of a
normal life” attendant to disability.43 Others use the language of
normalcy in even a more pointed way. A 1980 Wyoming case,
explaining that disability damages and hedonic damages are
doctrinally intertwined, stated:
[W]e [previously] held that loss of mobility may be
compensable even if it doesn’t result in loss of
earnings because mobility ‘is the right to be a
normal human being.’ This suggests that appellee’s
neck injury, which has caused him to curtail some of
his physical activities, should be compensable
because it has deprived him of ordinary human
pleasures.44
The word crippled appears less often, but still sometimes. For
example, in a 1967 case a federal district court upheld hedonic
damages based on a finding that the plaintiff, who had fractured
two heel bones, could no longer engage in “dancing, ice skating,
walking through the nearby woods or the Lake Michigan shore,

40

Bennett, 761 A.2d at 498 (citation omitted).

E.g., Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Ind. 1990); Flannery v.
United States, 297 S.E.2d 433, 436, 438 (W.Va. 1982).
41

In addition to the cases cited in notes 39 and 41, see Gary Gober, Closing
Argument: The Lawyer’s Crowning Achievement, TRIAL, April 1998 at 70, 75
(closing argument in a case about neck injury: “A year and a half ago, this man
was a whole person. He was 100 percent of a man, and he’s lost that.”)
42

43 Smith v. City of Evanston, 631 N.E. 2d 1269, 1278 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994); see
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W. 2d 757, 766-767 (Tex. 2003)
(treating lost enjoyment of life as equivalent to “the inability to have a normal
life”); see also Paul E. Marth, Note, Loss of Enjoyment of Life—Should It be a
Compensable Element of Personal Injury Damages, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 459,
459 (1975) (“the right to recover for the diminished capacity to enjoy life” . . .
“encompass[es] such ideas as inconvenience, embarrassment, loss of pleasure and
enjoyment of life, and inability to engage in normal activities”).
44

Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 12(Wyo. 1980).
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family picnics, mushroom hunting, and shopping.”45 The court
added that the plaintiff “will no longer be permitted to enjoy many
of the things in life which it may well be said ‘make life worth
living.’ He will always be crippled, and must suffer the
inconvenience and humiliation incident to such physical
condition.”46
Not all courts upholding hedonic damages awards have
treated disability as something that in and of itself limits the
ability to enjoy life. Some have instead identified specific pleasurecreating activities in which the plaintiffs (like others with like
impairments) can no longer engage. In one case, the court
awarded hedonic damages to a woman who experienced a severe
leg fracture based on evidence that as a result of her injury she
was “unable to leave her home without constant supervision and
assistance” and had “difficulty moving around in her own home.”47
Another upheld hedonic damages to a plaintiff who had lost some
mobility in her arms because she had to rearrange her kitchen “so
she could reach items,” she “has problems eating, dressing, and
brushing her hair,” she “sleeps in a recliner,” and she “is tired by
the evening and does not have the stamina she had before.”48
Numerous other cases have upheld hedonic damages awards based
on similar showings.49
45 Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733, 750 (D. Mich. 1967). The
district court’s decision was reversed on the separate ground that the defendant
was not in fact negligent. See Gowdy v. United States, 412 U.S. 525 (6th Cir.
1969).
46

See id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Harnesk v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 1991 WL 329584 at *2 (S.D. Fla.,
Dec. 27, 1991).
47

48

Ford v. State ex rel. DOTD, 760 So.2d 478, 488 (La. Ct. App. 2000).

See, e.g., Hendrix v. Stepanek, 771 N.E.2d, 559, 568 (Ill. Ct. App. 2002)
(“[P]laintiff testified that before the accident she was very active and enjoyed
gardening, housework, camping, canoeing, and motorcycle riding but that after
the accident either she could not enjoy these activities at all or she was only able
to enjoy them much less frequently.”); Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694,
717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (“While wearing her eye shield, Ms. Overstreet could
not swim or wash her own hair, and she was forced to avoid heavy lifting and
driving.”); Lawrence v. Town of Brighton, 1998 WL 749418 at *5-*6 (Tenn. Ct.
App., Oct. 28, 1998) (upholding award of hedonic damages where plaintiff “could
no longer raise or care for his dogs,” “was not able to cook or help his mother with
normal household chores,” “could not play with children as he had in the past,”
“could no longer engage in exercises such as lifting weights, running, and
jumping,” “could not help his brother with yard work or drive a car to Memphis
when he and his brother went shopping together,” and “was forced to sleep in a
recliner”); Payton v. City of New Orleans, 679 So.2d 446, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1996)
(upholding general damages award to plaintiff with severe leg and back pain as a
49
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Just as plaintiffs’ lawyers maneuver to keep their clients’
adaptations from shrinking recovery, there is evidence that juries
and courts disregard evidence of hedonic adjustment that is
presented. Consider Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Anderson,50 a
Texas case in which a four-year-old boy had three toes taken off by
a negligently maintained escalator.51 Included in the jury’s $17
million award was $1 million for future pain and mental anguish
(remitted by the trial judge to $308,394) and $6 million for past
and future physical impairment (remitted by the trial judge to $1.8
million).52 The court of appeals reinstated the full $1 million in the
future mental anguish category, and upheld the $1.8 million for
physical impairment.53 Of course, the procedural question before
the court of appeals was the existence of sufficient evidence to
uphold the jury verdict—not the court’s own view of that evidence.
result of a knee injury: “After the injury, she was unable to pursue her hobbies,
to play actively with her children or to continue to work. She testified that
emotional and sexual aspects of her marriage likewise deteriorated. She
continues to have pain and swelling, and the medical experts testified that her
condition is not expected to improve with time or further surgery.”); Lowe v.
State, 194 A.D.2d 898, 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (upholding damages award to
compensate individual whose left hand and forearm were severed for “inability to
perform certain day-to-day activities at all or to perform them as quickly as
before, and inability to participate in sports such as basketball, which claimant
previously enjoyed”); Nemmers v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 567, 575-576 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (awarding hedonic damages to a child who, because of the defendant’s
negligence in prenatal medical treatment, was born with mental retardation and
cerebral palsy, and reasoning that the plaintiff “will never be able to do most of
the normal things of life: the first date, parenting children, reading, debating the
politics of the day, etc.”; that the plaintiff “can see but not substantially
comprehend, and he can hear but not substantially understand”; and that “[t]here
may be love and affection in his life, but almost all of the developments to which a
normal person is exposed during his or her childhood and adulthood will pass him
by”); Yousuf v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432, 439 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (awarding
damages for lost enjoyment of life to plaintiff who, because of an injury to his
hand, was “unlikely” to “be able to pursue such things as tennis, weightlifting,
basketball, or heavy household chores” in the future); Kenton v. Hyatt Hotels, 693
S.W.2d 83, 97 (Mo. 1985) (inability to “enjoy a normal sexual life or have children
normally” and “destruction of her athletic lifestyle which will prevent her from
ever again playing tennis, skiing, running, jogging, playing softball, raquetball
[sic], hiking, backpacking and riding horses” relevant to lost enjoyment of life
component of pain and suffering); Young v. Warr, 165 S.E.2d 797, 901 (S.C. 1969)
(upholding an award of general damages, which included a component for lost
enjoyment of life, based on testimony that the plaintiff had lost control of his
bladder and bowel functions and “lost all ability for sexual function”).
50 78 S.W.3d 392 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), rvw. granted, jgt. vacated on
settlement (May 22, 2003), Docket No. 02-0426.
51

See id. at 399.

52

See id. at 410-414.

53

See id. at 412-413.
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But the discussion demonstrates the ways in which both juries and
courts may assess the evidence with some skepticism about the
ability of a plaintiff to overcome the trauma of a new disability.
In Schindler the court of appeals began its discussion of the
future pain and mental anguish award by noting that the
“evidence shows that Scooter is a happy child who, at the time of
trial, was active in many sports.” Nonetheless, the court said,
Scooter did show some “concern[]” about his foot (for example,
wearing a sock to avoid seeing it, even when swimming).54 Even
though his psychologist testified that he “will continue to
psychologically adjust to the loss of his toes and injury to his foot
in the future,”55 the court (and apparently the jury) gave more
weight to the evidence that “his self-esteem is based in large part
on his physical ability, and when he cannot compete athletically on
the level of his peers in the future, it will be very difficult for
him,”56 and that “by high-school age, the only sport in which
Scooter will be able to participate at a competitive level is
swimming.”57
Similarly, in reviewing the jury’s award (after remittitur) of
$1.5 million for future “physical impairment, sometimes called loss
of enjoyment of life,” the court quoted Scooter’s own testimony that
“‘I can do all the things I used to do.’”58 But again, the court held
the jury entitled to give more weight to the concomitant testimony
that “running [would] be more difficult” in Scooter’s future, “even
[his] walking will be affected,” “he will have problems with
standing for long periods and with climbing,” and might (if he
eventually had to have the other two toes amputated, as might
occur) in the future have to walk with “shortened steps” or suffer
an “ ‘appreciable limp.’” Already, noted the court, he “limps when
he is tired.” This evidence, the court held, was sufficient to
support $1.5 million in hedonic damages,59 even for a happy,
athletic child.
These cases hardly represent the entirety of hedonic
damages practice. But they should suffice to show how disability
and hedonic damages interact. Lawyers argue that disability saps
happiness, juries award hedonic damages to plaintiffs who
54

Id. at 411.

55

Id.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 411 n.7.

58

Id. at 412.

59

Id.
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experience disabling injuries, and judges uphold those awards. All
do so based on a view that disability—either inherently or because
it forecloses particular pleasurable activities—limits the ability to
enjoy life, by undermining independence, dignity, and overall
happiness. As we show in the next Part, those decisions reflect the
views of most nondisabled people about the lives of people with
disabilities. But they do not track the views of most people with
disabilities themselves.
II. DISABILITY AND HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY
The discussion in the last Part should demonstrate that
courts have upheld hedonic damages awards on the basis of the
view that disability—even in the form of relatively minor physical
impairments—necessarily limits the ability to enjoy life. That
view, we contend, does not reflect how people with disabilities
themselves feel. As we show in this Part, an extensive body of
research demonstrates that people who acquire disabilities tend
not to lose much enjoyment of life, at least after an initial
transition period. As the literature on hedonic adaptation shows,
people have a tendency to maintain their happiness following
adverse events through a variety of psychological mechanisms.60
And an extensive body of research also demonstrates that people
without disabilities view the prospect of life with a disability as
being far less enjoyable than people with disabilities themselves
report. As the literature on affective forecasting demonstrates,
people are poor predictors of how they will feel in new and
unfamiliar life circumstances.61 By placing nondisabled jurors and
judges in the position to decide whether plaintiffs’ disabilities limit
their ability to enjoy life, hedonic damages practice all but
guarantees that a pessimistic view of disability will be translated
into litigation practice, verdicts, and doctrine.
This Part proceeds as follows. In Section A, relying on
literature from a variety of disciplines, we show that many
60 For a good general overview of the hedonic adaptation literature, see
Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in WELL-BEING:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 302 (Daniel Kahneman, et al., eds.,
1999).

For good general overviews of the affective forecasting literature, see
Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES IN
EXPER. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 345 (2003); George Loewenstein & David Schkade,
Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING, supra note 60,
at 85; see also Blumenthal, supra note 20, at 165-181; Daniel T. Gilbert &
Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in the Forecasting of Future
Affective States, in FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL
COGNITION 178 (Joseph P. Forgas, ed., 2000).
61
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individuals with disabilities report that their conditions do not
limit their ability to enjoy life, or at least not significantly. In
Section B, we show that people without disabilities have a very
different, and much more negative, view about the impact of
disability on an individual’s quality of life, and, importantly, that
the litigation process is especially likely to bring out that negative
view. The decisions that uphold hedonic damages for disability,
though they depart from the views of most people with disabilities,
are therefore unsurprising.
A. The Views of People with Disabilities: Of Hedonic Adaptation
In a classic study published in 1978, Professor Philip
Brickman and his colleagues interviewed “lottery winners and
accident victims” to assess the degree to which major strokes of
good or bad fortune change a person’s happiness.62
They
interviewed 29 individuals with quadriplegia or paraplegia, 22
lottery winners, and 22 controls, and they asked the interviewees
to rate their general happiness and their current experience of
mundane everyday pleasures. Although “lottery winners rated
winning the lottery as a highly positive event, and paraplegics
rated their accident as a highly negative event,”63 the lottery
winners were nonetheless less happy, and the accident victims
happier, than the researchers had anticipated. In particular,
lottery winners and controls “were not significantly different” in
their self-reported happiness ratings; and although accident
victims did report that they “experienc[ed] their present as less
happy than controls,” their happiness rating was “still above the
midpoint of the scale,” and they “did not appear nearly as unhappy
as might have been expected.”64 In ratings of their experience of
mundane everyday pleasure, there was no meaningful difference
between lottery winners, accident victims, and controls.65

62 See Philip Brickman, Dan Coates & Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Lottery
Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY &
SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 917 (1978).
63

Id. at 920.

64

Id. at 920-921.

See id. at 921. For another classic study in the genre, though one that has
not become as famous, see Paul Cameron, et al., The Life Satisfaction of
Nonnormal Persons, 41 J. CONSULTING & CLIN. PSYCHOL. 207, 212 (1973) (finding
“no evidence of a difference between the handicapped and normals in selfreported life satisfaction or its linguistic equivalents”).
65
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The Brickman study was hardly definitive proof that
disability has no effect on the enjoyment of life.66 It involved a
small sample; its subjects had only one kind of disability; and the
subjects who had disabilities reported lower happiness than did
lottery winners and controls. Nonetheless, it has become the “most
famous article in the psychological literature on well-being.”67
Subsequent research confirms that people have a “psychological
immune system that detects and neutralizes events that challenge
[their] sense of well-being.”68 Through a variety of defense
mechanisms—distraction, rationalization, illusion, and so forth—
our minds keep our happiness relatively stable.69 Such hedonic
adaptation may involve changes “in interests, values, goals,
attention, or characterization of a situation,” it may involve
“consciously directing one’s attention away from troubling
thoughts,” and it may also involve “cognitive transformations of
situations—for example, by interpreting a tragedy as a ‘learning
66 See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 60, at 322 n.25 (noting that the
“evidence of hedonic adaptation in the [Brickman] paper is not overwhelming”).

David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make
People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 340, 340 (1998).
67

68 Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 61, at 380; accord
Daniel T. Gilbert, et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 617, 619 (1998).
69 See Gilbert, et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 68, at 619 (“Ego, defemse,
rationalization, dissonance reduction, motivated reasoning, positive illusions, selfserving attribution, self-deception, self-enhancement, self-affirmation, and selfjustification are just some of the terms that psychologists have used to describe
the various strategies, mechanisms, tactics, and maneuvers of the psychological
immune system.”); Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 61, at 371374 (describing process by which we make sense of unexpected events and then
“ordinize” them “in a way that robs them of their emotional power”); see also
Rebecca L. Collins, et al., A Better World or a Shattered Vision? Changes in Life
Perspectives Following Victimization, 8 SOCIAL COGNITION 263, 279-284 (1990)
(discussing coping strategies people employ following adverse life events); Shelley
E. Taylor & David A. Armor, Positive Illusions and Coping with Adversity, 64 J.
PERSONALITY 873, passim (1996) (discussing role of positive illusions in coping
with adverse life events). For a general discussion of psychological sense-making
processes and “emotional evanescence,” see Timothy D. Wilson, et al., Making
Sense: The Causes of Emotional Evanescence, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ECONOMIC
DECISIONS, VOL. I: RATIONALITY AND WELL-BEING 209 (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D.
Carrillo, eds., 2003). Wilson and Gilbert have highlighted hindsight bias—
“whereby people transform an event psychologically after it occurs to make it
seem more predictable than it really was”—as one of the psychological tools that
leads to the “evanescence” of negative emotions. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective
Forecasting, supra note 61, at 374. On hindsight bias generally, see Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 571, 576-586 (1998).
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experience.’”70 Indeed, people who experience adversity often find
benefit in it, such as the “strengthening of relationships with
family and friends,” the “development of greater patience,
tolerance, empathy, and courage,” or a “valued change in life’s
priorities and personal goals.”71 Through such adaptations, most
people in virtually all demographic groups—even those who
experience economic disadvantage or racial stigma—report
positive levels of happiness.72
The general phenomenon holds true in the disability area.
A massive body of research has demonstrated that people who
acquire a range of disabilities typically do not experience any (or
do not experience much) permanent reduction in the enjoyment of
life.73 After an “initial adjustment period,”74 people tend to adapt
psychologically to having a disability. Whether because they gain
more accurate information on their actual life and activity
prospects,75 or because their new disability “forces reexamination,
reconceptualization, and the alternation of values, attitudes,
70 Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 60, at 302-303; see also Shelley E.
Taylor, Adjustment to Threatening Events: A Theory of Cognitive Adaptation, 38
AMER. PSYCHOLOGIST 1161, 1161 (1983) (arguing that “the readjustment process
focuses around three themes: a search for meaning in the experience, an attempt
to regain mastery over the event in particular and over one’s life more generally,
and an effort to enhance one’s self-esteem—to feel good about oneself again
despite the personal setback”).
71 Glenn Affleck & Howard Tennen, Construing Benefits From Adversity:
Adaptational Significance and Dispositional Underpinnings, 64 J. PERSONALITY
899, 902 (1996).

See Ed Diener & Carol Diener, Most People are Happy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI.
181, 181 (1996).
72

73 For a general discussion of this research, some of which is discussed in
more detail in the remainder of this section, see Carol J. Gill, Health
Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of Relevant
Empirical Evidence and a Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 526, 528529 (2000); see also M.G. Eisenberg & C.C. Saltz, Quality of Life Among Aging
Spinal Cord Injured Persons:
Long Term Rehabilitation Outcomes, 29
PARAPLEGIA 514, 517 (1991) (collecting studies finding that “quality of life among
those with even severely disabling conditions may be as high as those with no
disability”); Thomas Mehnert, et al., Correlates of Life Satisfaction in Those With
Disabling Conditions, 35 REHAB. PSYCHOL. 3, 5 (1990) (collecting studies finding
that people with a variety of disabilities experience at least as much life
satisfaction as nondisabling controls).
74 Carol J. Gill, Depression in the Context of Disability and the “Right to Die,”
25 THEOR. MED. 171, 185 (2004).
75 See Ellen Smith Pryor, The Tort Law Debate, Efficiency, and the Kingdom
of the Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV. 91,
111-112 (1993) (suggesting the importance of the disability-related information
deficit suffered by people without disabilities).
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beliefs, and desires,”76 people with disabilities experience a hedonic
transformation.77
One researcher’s description of her own
experience with partial paralysis illustrates the point:
When I did [accept my disability], it wasn’t at all like
[I had] envisioned; settling for second-rate goals and
dreams. It wasn’t even defusing the disappointment
that I would never again hear whistles when I
walked, or dance, or ride in a horse show, or walk
alone in the rain, or go to the bathroom by myself. It
sure as hell wasn’t the much touted process of
discovering substitute gratifications for the ones I
had lost.
It was more like those things not only didn’t
matter any more, they wouldn’t have mattered even
if I could still have done them. I didn’t need to be
able to do them—or to mourn their loss—in order to
maintain some image of myself.78
This kind of transformation is far from uncommon. Rather,
studies have shown that people with disabilities “ranging from
quadriplegia to blindness” tend to “report positive well-being”
when asked.79 Although people with spinal cord injuries report
that they are “very unhappy immediately following their trauma,”
most report that they are happy by the third week after the
accident.80 “[I]ndividuals who use wheelchairs are believed to be
76

Id. at 114.

See Marilynn J. Phillips, Disability and Ethnicity in Conflict: A Study in
Transformation, in WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES 195, 196-200 (Michelle Fine &
Adrienne Asch eds., 1988) (discussing various theories of transformation offered
by researchers).
77

78 Carolyn L. Vash, The Psychology of Disability, 22 REHABILITATION
PSYCHOLOGY 145, 152-153 (1975), excerpted in CAROLYN L. VASH & NANCY M.
CREWE, PSYCHOLOGY OF DISABILITY 160 (2d ed. 2004). This quotation came to our
attention because it is featured in Pryor, supra note 75, at 115.
79

Diener & Diener, supra note 72, at 181.

Diener & Diener, supra note 72, at 181; see Camille B. Wortman & Roxane
Cohen Silver, Coping with Irrevocable Loss, in CATACLYSMS, CRISES, AND
CATASTROPHES: PSYCHOLOGY IN ACTION 189, 198 (Gary R. VandenBos & Brenda
K. Bryant, eds., 1987); see also C. Lundqvist, et al., Spinal Cord Injuries:
Clinical, Functional, and Emotional Status, 16 SPINE 78, 82 (1991) (finding that
after 4 years, subjects with spinal cord injuries reported levels of subjective wellbeing and quality of life that were similar to those of a nondisabled reference
group); G.G. Whiteneck, et al., Mortality, Morbidity, and Psychosocial Outcomes of
Persons Spinal Cord Injured More Than 20 Years Ago, 30 PARAPLEGIA 617, 626
(1992) (“Approximately three quarters of the subjects rated their current quality
of life as either good or excellent on a 5-point scale.”).
80
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happy by their friends and family, can recall more good than bad
events in their lives, are rated as happy by an interviewer, and
report more positive than negative emotions in daily experiencesampling measures.”81 People “with severe, multiple handicaps”
and people “with chronic mental problems” also report high levels
of subjective well-being.82 Similarly, although burn injuries often
cause “an initially severe impact” on well-being, the emotional
impact “tend[s] to be transitory”; after roughly twelve months,
“[t]he majority of burn survivors appear to adjust quite well to
their injuries.”83 And “young patients with limb deficiencies, as a
group, appear to be relatively resilient to maladjustment.”84
In a recent study, Jason Riis and his colleagues used the
technique of “ecological momentary assessment” (EMA) to measure
the reported well-being of individuals who were undergoing kidney
dialysis.85 They found virtually no significant differences between
those individuals and a control group of individuals without major
health conditions.
In particular, there was no statistically
significant difference between the two groups in reports of overall
mood (a five-point scale from “very pleasant to very unpleasant”)
or in reports of the extent to which they were experiencing nine
specific emotions (“happy, joyful, pleased, enjoyment/fun,
depressed/blue,
unhappy,
frustrated,
angry/hostile,
worried/anxious”).86
Nor were there statistically significant
81

Diener & Diener, supra note 72, at 184.

Diener & Diener, supra note 72 at 181; see also Richard Stensman,
Severely Mobility-Disabled People Assess the Quality of Their Lives, 17 SCAND. J.
REHAB. MED. 87, 90-91 (1985) (finding no statistically significant difference in
self-reported quality of life between subjects with severe mobility impairments
and nondisabled controls).
82

83 David R. Patterson, et al., Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries,
113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 362 (1993).
84 Vida L. Tyc, Psychosocial Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with
Limb Deficiencies: A Review, 12 CLIN. PSYCHOL. REV. 275, 286 (1992).
85 See Jason Riis, et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A
Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.:
GEN. 3 (2005). As the authors describe the EMA method:

In EMA, subjects are given personal digital assistants (PDAs; e.g.,
Palm Pilots) to carry with them wherever they go for a period of seven
days or more. The method is designed to minimize the influence of
biased recall. The PDA prompts the subject to answer questions at
random times throughout the day. In studies of well-being, subjects are
asked how they feel at that very moment.
Id. at 4; see generally Arthur A. Stone, et al., Ecological Momentary Assessment,
in WELL-BEING, supra note 60, at 26 (discussing the EMA technique).
86

Riis, et al., supra note 85, at 5-6
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differences in reports about pain, tiredness, or overall life
satisfaction.87 The authors concluded “that hemodialysis patients
do, largely at least, adapt to their condition. Although they report
their health as being much worse than that of healthy controls,
they do not appear to be much, if at all, less happy than people
who do not have kidney disease or any other serious health
condition.”88
A recent longitudinal study conducted by two British
economists reported similar, though less pronounced, results.89
Using data from the British Household Panel Survey to “track[]
individuals’ levels of reported life-satisfaction in the years leading
up to, and after, disability,” they found “a striking degree of
recovery in human wellbeing” among those who have less severe
disabilities.90 But though they found that “a person’s emotional
damage from disability reduces through the years,” they did not
find “a complete return to the old happiness level.”91 For people
with severe disabilities, the authors found (based on a relatively
small sample) that well-being recovers to a similar degree, but
more slowly.92
Even in those instances where disability does durably
reduce subjective well-being, there is good reason to think that it is
broader social factors, and not anything intrinsic in the disability,
that cause the reduction. A meta-analysis of 29 studies of selfreported quality of life of individuals with spinal cord injuries
found that those individuals report a lower quality of life than do

87

See Riis, et al., supra note 85, at 6.

88

Riis, et al., supra note 85, at 7.

See ANDREW J. OSWALD & NATTAVUDH POWDTHAVEE, DOES HAPPINESS
ADAPT? A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF DISABILITY WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMISTS
AND JUDGES (Nov. 1, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
89

90

OSWALD & POWDTHAVEE, supra note 89, at 21.

OSWALD & POWDTHAVEE, supra note 89, at 21; see also M. Kannisto & H.
Sintonen, Later Health-Related Quality of Life in Adults Who Have Sustained
Spinal Cord Injury in Childhood, 35 SPINAL CORD 747, 750 (1997) (finding that
adults who experienced spinal cord injuries in childhood reported a slightly, but
only slightly, lower health-related quality of life than did nondisabled controls); R.
Stensman, Adjustment to Traumatic Spinal Cord Injury: A Longitudinal Study of
Self-Reported Quality of Life, 32 PARAPLEGIA 416 (1994) (similar findings with
individuals who experienced their injuries in adulthood); Adrienne Asch,
Distracted by Disability, 7 CAMBR. Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 77, 80-81 (1998) (noting
that “[n]ot everyone who has a disability is satisfied with life” but that “overall
disabled people believe that they can achieve enough of their goals to make life
worthwhile”).
91

92

See OSWALD & POWDTHAVEE, supra note 89, at 10.
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their nondisabled peers.93 But the degree of an individual’s
impairment had only “a very minor effect” on reported quality of
life.94 Instead, the crucial determinants were family involvement,
work opportunities, mobility, and social integration.95 Disability
See Marcel Dijkers, Quality of Life After Spinal Cord Injury: A Meta
Analysis of the Effects of Disablement Components, 35 SPINAL CORD 829, 833
(1997); see also Marcus J. Fuhrer, et al., Relationship of Life Satisfaction to
Impairment, Disability, and Handicap Among Persons with Spinal Cord Injury
Living in the Community, 73 ARCH. PHYS. MED. & REHABIL. 552, 554 (1992)
(finding that “on average, people with SCI who are living in the community report
a lower level of satisfaction with life than do people in the general population”);
Mehnert, et al., supra note 73, at 12 (finding that people with a range of
disabilities experience less life satisfaction than people without them, but that
“[e]ven among those who consider themselves severely disabled, and those who
report themselves unable to work or keep house, the majority indicate that they
are at least somewhat satisfied with their lives”); Richard Schulz & Susan
Decker, Long-Term Adjustment to Physical Disability: The Role of Social
Support, Perceived Control, and Self-Blame, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 1162, 1170 (1985) (reporting, in study of individuals with spinal cord
injuries, that “the subjects in this study reported a mean degree of well-being that
was only slightly lower than that of other nondisabled adult populations”); but see
Kathleen Chwalisz, et al., Autonomic Arousal Feedback and Emotional
Experience: Evidence From the Spinal Cord Injured, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 820, 823 (1988) (finding no statistically significant differences between
subjects with spinal cord injuries and nondisabled controls on most measures of
subjective well-being); L.A. Cushman & J. Hassett, Spinal Cord Injury: 10 and
15 Years After, 30 PARAPLEGIA 690, 694 (1992) (reporting that subjects with spinal
cord injuries “who were surveyed 10 and 15 years post injury rated their
perceived quality of life as equal to or somewhat better than that of their peers,
on average”). Professors Ville and Ravaud note that the studies finding a lower
quality of life for people with spinal cord injuries often use measures that beg the
question by assuming that functional limitations necessarily limit well-being. See
I. Ville & J.F. Ravaud, Subjective Well-Being and Severe Motor Impairments: The
Tetrafigap Survey on the Long-Term Outcome of Tetraplegic Spinal Cord Injured
Persons, 52 SOCIAL SCI. & MED. 369, 370 (2001); see generally Tracey C. Lintern, et
al., Quality of Life (QoL) in Severely Disabled Multiple Sclerosis Patients:
Comparison of Three QoL Measures Using Multidimensional Scaling, 10 QUALITY
OF LIFE RES. 371, 372 (2001) (“Most currently available forms of QoL assessment
employ external value systems; thus specific goals or activities important to the
individual patient may not be included in the measurement scale.”)
93

Dijkers, supra note 93, at 833; but cf. Mehnert, et al., supra note 73, at 1012 (finding that degree of functional limitation was directly associated with
reduced life satisfaction, but that “social interactional variables” were important
as well).
94

95 See Dijkers, supra note 93, at 835; see also Brent W. Chase, et al., Life
Satisfaction Among Persons with Spinal Cord Injuries, J. REHAB., July-Sept.
2000, at 14 (finding that marital status and “perceived control”—the ability to
make decisions about one’s life—were the most significant predictors of positive
life satisfaction among people with spinal cord injuries, and that the opportunity
to direct personal assistants and the availability of at least part-time work were
highly correlated with positive perceptions of control); Vappu Viemero &
Christina Krause, Quality of Life in Individuals with Physical Disabilities, 67
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does not inherently limit an individual’s opportunities along these
dimensions; rather, such limitations often “stem from the
frustration of social rejection, of physically inaccessible movies and
restaurants, of inadequate social gatherings, or of discrimination
in the workplace.”96
The doctrine allowing hedonic damages for disabling
injuries fails to take account of the degree to which people with
disabilities adapt to their conditions. Contrary to the view of many
of the courts whose decisions we cited in Part I,97 people with
disabilities do not, by and large, experience disability as inherently
limiting their enjoyment of life. And even those courts that
identify particular pleasure-creating activities that people with
disabilities can no longer perform are missing two significant
points. First, the degree to which disability actually limits those
activities is often overstated.98 Although courts frequently suggest
that a disabling injury makes an individual unable to have sex,
participate in athletics, and otherwise lead an active life,99 that is
not generally true. People with disabilities can still have sex,100
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 317, 321 (1998) (finding that social factors,
and not the degree of medical impairment, were key determinants of life
satisfaction in individuals with disabilities); Ashley R. Craig, et al., Spinal Cord
Injury: A Search for Determinants of Depression Two Years After the Event, 33
BRIT. J. CLIN. PSYCHOL. 221, 227 (1994) (finding that physical pain and perceived
loss of control of one’s life were the major determinants of depression in people
with spinal cord injuries, and that “medical characteristics such as level of lesion
and completeness of lesion” were not associated with depression); Fuhrer, et al.,
supra note 93, at 555-556 (finding that the social factors of disablement, and not
the degree of medical impairment, were the determinants of lower life satisfaction
among people with spinal cord injuries); Schulz & Decker, supra note 93, at 1170
(“Persons [with spinal cord injuries] who had high levels of social support, were
satisfied with their social contacts, and felt that they had high levels of control
reported high levels of well-being.”); Ville & Ravaud, supra note 93, at 370, 377379 (noting that self-reported well-being measures in individuals with spinal cord
injuries “increase with increased quality and richness of social contacts” and with
“indicators of social status such as income and level of education” as well as
occupational level, and reporting results of study showing that similar
“sociological variables” play a major role in perceived well-being).
96 Asch, Distracted by Disability, supra note 91, at 80; see also Nancy
Weinberg, Physically Disabled People Assess the Quality of Their Lives, 45 REHAB.
LIT. 12, 14 (1984) (finding that “adjustment to societal attitudes was the most
difficult” for interview subjects with disabilities). We develop this point infra at
text accompanying notes 142-152.
97

See supra text accompanying notes 34-59.

98

See infra note 147 and accompanying text.

99

See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Colette Ray & Julia West, Social, Sexual, and Personal
Implications of Paraplegia, 22 PARAPLEGIA 75, 75-76, 81-83 (1984) (describing
100
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work,101 compete athletically and go to ballgames,102 and
participate in other activities in the community.103 Second, and
more fundamental, hedonic adaptation often works by
transforming what one values and enjoys. Even if a disability
prevents an individual from performing a task that she previously
enjoyed, she will not necessarily experience that as an hedonic
loss. People who acquire spinal cord injuries, for example, come to
believe that “mental functioning, communication, social
participation, and seeing”—all things they can still do—are more
important to their enjoyment of life than mobility.104 More
generally, they begin to think of autonomy as consisting in being
“in charge of how, when, by whom, and in what ways certain tasks
are performed” rather than in personally performing those
tasks.105 By this process, the inability to move around without a
wheelchair, or to dress and bathe oneself, is not perceived as an
hedonic loss. Indeed, people who acquire disabilities often come to
find that “[t]hey have incorporated the disabilities into their

ability of people with spinal cord injuries to have sex, despite obstacles). For
extensive discussions of sex and disability, from very different perspectives, see
TOM SHAKESPEARE, ET AL., THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF DISABILITY: UNTOLD DESIRES
(1996); THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL DISABILITY 207-255
(Robert P. Marinelli & Arthur E. Dell Orto, eds., 1977).
101 The employment rate for people with disabilities does lag well behind
that of people without disabilities, but that is to a large extent the result of
discrimination and the lack of social services, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 19-54 (2004)—for which courts could
compensate directly.

See, e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C. Arena, L.P., 117 F.3d 579
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (requiring sports arena to provide wheelchair users seating areas
with a line of sight over standing spectators).
102

103 See, e.g., Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Regal Cinemas, Inc.,
339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (requiring movie theaters to be accessible to people
who use wheelchairs).
104 Kannisto & Sintonen, supra note 91, at 749; see also Schulz & Decker,
supra note 93, at 1171 (noting that individuals with spinal cord injuries “saw
themselves as better off than most nondisabled persons,” and that they did so
“partly by selectively focusing on attributes that made them appear advantaged
(e.g., brain is more important than brawn)”); Weinberg, supra note 96, at 14
(similar, but noting that the process of adjustment “was not always easy”).
105 Asch, Distracted by Disability, supra note 91, at 79; see also id. (“The
father or mother who accompanies a child to a sporting event supervises the child
even if they are both driven by an assistant because the child is too young to drive
and the parent’s seizure disorder makes driving unsafe. The woman with a
mobility impairment whose personal assistant shops for food she selects is no less
in charge of her life than the woman who trades shopping for babysitting so that
she and her friend can both maintain homes and work lives.”).
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identities, into their very selves. And they see their experiences as
yielding much that is positive in their personal growth.”106
B. The Views of People Without Disabilities: Of Affective
Forecasting
The discussion in the previous section should demonstrate
that people who acquire disabilities do not find that their
enjoyment of life is impaired—perhaps not at all, and at least not
substantially. But people without disabilities think differently.
They tend to believe that disability inevitably has a very negative
effect on the enjoyment and quality of one’s life.107 This is true of
the general public,108 and it is true even of professionals who spend
a great deal of time interacting with people with disabilities.
Reviewing over a dozen studies, Carol Gill found it “consistent and
stunning” that “health professionals significantly underestimate
the quality of life of persons with disabilities compared with the
actual assessments made by persons with disabilities
themselves.”109
PAUL LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS ON
DISABILITY 209 (2003); see also Weinberg, supra note 96, at 13 (describing
interviews with individuals who said they would refuse, if offered, a risk-free
surgery that would completely cure their disabilities: “a primary factor in their
opposition to a cure was the fear that they would no longer be the same person”).
106

See NATIONAL COUNCIL
PAPER 22-25 (1997).
107

ON

DISABILITY, ASSISTED SUICIDE: A POSITION

108 See Loewenstein & Schkade, Wouldn’t it be Nice?, supra note 61, at 92
(discussing “very substantial evidence” that healthy people underestimate the
quality of life of sick people”); George Loewenstein, et al., Projection Bias in
Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. J. ECON. 1209, 1212 (2003) (“[C]ross-sectional
studies have consistently found that nonpatients’ predictions of the quality of life
associated with serious medical conditions are lower than actual patients’ selfreported quality of life.”); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with
Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479, 1508 & n.12 (2001)
(discussing how the Oregon health rationing plan incorporated biases toward
disability through the use of a public quality-of-life survey); Asch, Distracted by
Disability, supra note 91, at 82 (same).
109 Gill, Health Professionals, supra note 73, at 530; see also John R. Bach &
Margaret C. Tilton, Life Satisfaction and Well-Being Measures in Ventilator
Assisted Individuals with Traumatic Tetraplegia, 75 ARCH. PHYS. MED. & REHAB.
626, 629 (1994) (finding that nondisabled health care professionals significantly
underestimated the life satisfaction expressed by individuals with spinal cord
injuries); John R. Bach & Denise I. Campagnolo, Psychosocial Adjustment of Postpoliomyelitis Venitlator Assisted Individuals, 73 ARCH. PHYS. MED. REHAB. 934,
934 (1992) (reporting that “Muscular Dystrophy Association clinic directors
significantly underestimated life satisfaction reported by Duchenne muscular
dystrophy ventilator users”); Eugenia Bodenhamer, et al., Staff and Patient
Perceptions of the Psychosocial Concerns of Spinal Cord Injured Persons, 62 AM. J.
PHYS. MED. 182, 182 (1983) (citing studies that “revealed significant discrepancies
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That finding should not be stunning, however. When
attempting to assess how people in unfamiliar situations feel, we
often do so by seeking to predict how we ourselves would feel in
those circumstances.110 And a large body of evidence demonstrates
that we tend to do a very poor job of predicting our own future
happiness.111 In particular, there is a great deal of evidence that
we “overestimate the enduring impact that future events will have
on our emotional reactions”112 and thus underestimate our ability
to adapt to adverse life events.113

between the way professional staff view spinal cord injured patients’
psychological reactions and the responses the patients actually report”); Laura A.
Cushman & Marcel F. Dijkers, Depressed Mood in Spinal Cord Injured Patients:
Staff Perceptions and Patient Realities, 71 ARCH. PHYS. MED. REHAB. 191, 195
(1990) (finding “a consistent bias on the part of [rehabilitation facility] staff to
overestimate depressed mood, relative to the report of patients themselves”);
Frederick A. Ernst, Contrasting Perceptions of Distress by Research Personnel and
Their Spinal Cord Injured Subjects, 66 AM. J. PHYS. MED. 12, 13-14 (1987)
(reporting results similar to Bodenhamer, supra).
See Leaf Van Boven & George Loewenstein, Social Projection of Transient
Drive States, 29 PERS. & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 1159, 1162, 1165 (2003).
110

See Blumenthal, supra note 20, at 162 (“[S]ubstantial empirical evidence
demonstrates that people are in fact unable to accurately predict their own or
others’ emotional states.”); see generally Loewenstein & Schkade, Wouldn’t it be
Nice?, supra note 61, at 88-94 (reviewing the literature).
111

112

Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 61, at 351.

See George Loewenstein & Shane Frederick, Predicting Reactions to
Environmental Change, in ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS, AND BEHAVIOR:
THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUATION AND DEGRADATION 52, 66 (Max H.
Bazerman, et al., eds., 1997) (reporting results of a study of predicted reactions to
environmental change in which the subjects “seem[ed] to expect changes in their
circumstances to affect their quality of life in the future more than equivalent
things have affected their quality of life in the past”); Wilson & Gilbert, Affective
Forecasting, supra note 61, at 353 (“The impact bias has been found in a variety
of populations (e.g., college students, professors, sports fans, dieters, vacationers,
snake phobics, people taking medical tests), with a wide range of emotional
events (e.g., romantic breakups, personal insults, sports victories, electoral
defeats, parachute jumps, failures to lose weight, reading tragic stories, and
learning the results of pregnancy and HIV tests.”); Gilbert, et al., Immune
Neglect, supra note 68, at 633 (reporting results of studies in which subjects
“overestimated the duration of their affective reactions to romantic
disappointments, career difficulties, political defeats, distressing news, clinical
devaluations, and personal rejections”); Loewenstein, et al., Projection Bias, supra
note 108, at 1213 (discussing research suggesting “underappreciation of
adaptation”); Riis, et al., supra note 85, at 3 (“Research in diverse domains has
documented a general tendency for people to underestimate their own and others’
speed of adaptation to negative as well as positive outcomes.”); Timothy D.
Wilson, et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 28
J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 821, 829 (2000) (finding that “[c]ollege football
113
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In the context of disability, this failure of affective
forecasting interacts with and feeds the general societal view that
disability is a tragedy and that people with disabilities should be
pitied.114 There is no doubt that disability is a condition that is
subject to a great deal of social stigma.115 As a result, “[m]any
able-bodied persons are tremendously fearful about becoming
disabled,”116 and they believe that disabilities are far more limiting
than they actually are.117 That fear may stem from “‘existential
anxiety’—the dread that such a phenomenon might affect an
observer especially in the process of aging—or [from] ‘aesthetic
anxiety’—the fear of the alien, strange, displeasing, unattractive,
or ‘different.’”118 Or it may simply reflect the well-documented
psychological “tendency to automatically associate positive
characteristics with [one’s] ingroups more easily than outgroups”
and “to associate negative characteristics with outgroups more

fans overestimated the extent to which the outcome of a football game would
influence their overall happiness”).
See infra note 147 and accompanying text; see also Beatrice A. Wright,
Attitudes and the Fundamental Negative Bias: Conditions and Corrections, in
ATTITUDES TOWARD PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 3, 8 (Harold E. Yuker, ed., 1988)
(collecting studies showing “the ease with which devalued groups are regarded as
unfortunate, despite the fact that members of those groups do not view
themselves as unfortunate”).
114

See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86
VA. L. REV. 397, 436-445 (2000).
115

116 Paul Steven Miller, The Impact of Assisted Suicide on Persons with
Disabilities—Is It a Right Without Freedom?, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 47, 49 (1993).
117

See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 423-424.

Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or
Biased Reasoning?, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY
RIGHTS 26, 34 (Linda Hamilton Krieger, ed., 2003); see Harlan Hahn, The Politics
of Physical Differences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. SOC. ISS. 39, 42-45
(1988); see also Miller, supra note 116, at 53 (“The root of prejudice against people
with disabilities comes from several sources. Foremost is that of fear: fear of the
loss of autonomy and the ‘there but for the grace of God go I’ realization that
disability can ‘afflict’ any person. Such fears are, of course, based on the
prejudicial assumptions about life with a disability that society itself creates.
Able-bodied people see ‘confinement’ to a wheelchair, or reliance upon attendant
care, or a lack of hearing or vision, as losses of independence, which, in this
society, is often regarded as worse than death itself. Furthermore, nothing in our
society is despised like difference. Because our society assumes difference is the
equivalent of inferiority and treats people with visible differences accordingly,
people have grave fears about being viewed as deviating from accepted societal
norms.”); see generally R. William English, Correlates of Stigma Toward
Physically Disabled Persons, in THE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF
PHYSICAL DISABILITY, supra note 100, at 162.
118
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negatively than ingroups.”119 As members of a socially stigmatized
class, people with disabilities are a classic outgroup.
It is true, of course, that under what is (unintuitively)
called the “Golden Rule,” jurors are not supposed to figure
damages by asking how much money they themselves would want
in exchange for experiencing the injury in question.120
Nonetheless, jurors must calculate damages using some sense of
the value of a loss—and their own perspective is unavoidable when
they assign that value. Thus when judges and jurors make
decisions about what damages properly compensate for disabling
injuries, they are likely to hold and use the nondisabled public’s
pessimistic views of disabled quality of life. Very few judges have
disabilities.121 And individuals with disabilities are often excluded
from juries.122 As Wendy Hensel has written in the context of
“wrongful birth” actions, jurors tend to have a “distance from the
disabled perspective” that leaves them “subject to bias and
prejudice.”123 The Schindler case we discussed in Part I.B. above,
119 Niljana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism,
and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004). For
discussions in the legal literature of this general phenomenon, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (2006); Clark Freshman, Whatever Happened to AntiSemitism? How Social Science Theories Identify Discrimination and Promote
Coalitions Between “Different” Minorities, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 313, 383-409
(2000). For a good overview of theories and research on the attitudes of people
without disabilities toward people with disabilities, see generally ATTITUDES
TOWARD PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 114.

See L.R. James, Annot., Instructions in a Personal Injury Action Which,
in Effect, Tell Jurors That in Assessing Damages They Should Put Themselves in
Injured Person’s Place, 96 A.L.R.2d 760 (1964); McCaffery, et al., supra note 20, at
1383-1387 (discussing this “golden rule” and lawyers’ ways around it).
120

121
See
Brown
Will
Present
at
ABA
Conference,
http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/current/connects.htm (visited May 30,
2006) (“While statistics on lawyers and judges with disabilities nationwide have
not been reliably gathered, [Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judge Richard] Brown
said he knows of two blind judges and that he currently is the nation’s only deaf
judge.”) Given the age of the members of the judiciary, it stands to reason that
there are some with mobility impairments, and others presumably have less
visible disabilities.

In the past, that exclusion took the form of categorical statutory
prohibitions, some of which remain on the statute books. See Tennessee v. Lane,
541 U.S. 509, 524 n.9 (2004) (citing statutes from Tennessee and Michigan).
Today, it more often occurs through the use of peremptory challenges. See
generally Andrew Weis, Peremptory Challenges: The Last Barrier to Jury Service
for People with Disabilities, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (1997).
122

Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful
Life Actions, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 185 (2005).
123
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in which judges and jurors disregarded extensive evidence that the
plaintiff had in fact adapted hedonically, is hardly a surprise in
this context.124
Indeed, the litigation process itself is structured in a
manner that is likely to trigger the very cognitive shortcuts that
make affective forecasting so flawed. Daniel Gilbert and his
colleagues have found that our tendency to be unaware of our own
effective “psychological immune systems”—they term this
tendency “immune neglect”—is a substantial contributor to our
inability to predict adaptation to adverse events.125 Because the
presentation of evidence in litigation emphasizes the pain and
unhappiness plaintiffs have felt as a result of their injuries, it
further directs jurors’ attention away from the likelihood of
hedonic adaptation.
Even more, the litigation process encourages “focalism,”
another key contributor to the inability to predict adaptation.
“Focalism” is a phenomenon under which people who are asked to
predict an event’s effects on happiness “focus too much on the
occurrence in question” and “fail to consider the consequences of
other events that are likely to occur”: “People think about the focal
event in a vacuum without reminding themselves that their lives
will not occur in a vacuum but will be filled with many other
events.”126 A trial, of course, focuses attention on the particular
injury,127 and “when attention is drawn to the possibility of a
change in any significant aspect of life, the perceived effect of this
change on well-being is likely to be exaggerated.”128 Such focalism
is likely to be particularly strong in cases where nondisabled jurors
must assess the prospects of happiness with a disability: As Paul
Longmore has written, “‘outsiders,’ nondisabled people, latch onto
a single trait (for example, paraplegia or arthritic pain), while

124

See supra text accompanying notes 50-59.

Gilbert, et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 68, at 619, 633; see also Wilson
& Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 61, at 369 (“A major source of the
impact bias, we suggest, is that people fail to anticipate the extent to which they
will transform events psychologically in ways that ameliorate their impact.”).
125

Wilson, et al., Focalism, supra note 113, at 822; see also Wilson & Gilbert,
Affective Forecasting, supra note 61, at 366 (“By neglecting to consider how much
these other events will capture their attention and influence their emotions,
people overestimate the impact of the focal event.”).
126

127 See Schkade & Kahneman, Living in California, supra note 67, at 340
(“[A] judge who tries to imagine the life of a paraplegic or of a lottery winner will
naturally focus attention on the special circumstances of these cases.”).
128

Schkade & Kahneman, Living in California, supra note 67, at 340.
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‘insiders,’ people with disabilities, take into account the full range
of their experience.”129
It is only to be expected, then, that judicial decisions on
hedonic damages understate the experienced happiness of people
with disabilities. Both the general inability to predict that
happiness will adapt following adverse events and the social
stigma toward disability are intensified by the legal process. In
the next Part, we discuss the normative implications of these facts.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
In the previous part, we showed that people with
disabilities tend to have strikingly different views than
nondisabled people regarding the effect a disability has on the
enjoyment of life. In particular, people with disabilities tend to
adapt to their conditions, to the extent that they experience as
much (or nearly as much) enjoyment of life as do nondisabled
people. People without disabilities, by contrast, tend to believe
that disability inevitably makes life substantially less enjoyable.
Where nondisabled jurors and judges decide how much to
compensate for the hedonic costs of disabling injuries, then, they
are likely to operate on the basis of a view that is not authentic to
that of many or most people with disabilities.
But that is merely a descriptive point. As a normative
matter, the question remains: How should the law of hedonic
damages respond to disabling injuries? The mere fact that people
with and without disabilities have different views regarding the
hedonic effects of disability does not determine whose views should
control. Moreover, as the psychological evidence discussed in the
previous part makes clear, people with disabilities themselves
have an array of views regarding the effects of disability on the
enjoyment of life. Where individual plaintiffs with disabling
injuries convince juries that they have experienced a loss of life’s
pleasures, should their views be irrelevant simply because they
may reflect a minority position among people with disabilities?
In this Part, we address the normative question that the
discussion in the previous Part leaves open: How should the law of
hedonic damages respond to the tendency of nondisabled people to
believe that disabling injuries limit life’s enjoyment far more than
people with disabilities tend to experience? We believe that the
law should not award any damages for loss of enjoyment of life
based on disability. Where courts uphold hedonic damages awards
129

LONGMORE, supra note 106, at 209.
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based on the view that disabling injuries limit life’s enjoyment by
keeping the plaintiff from being a “whole person,” they entrench
the societal view that disability is inherently tragic, and they
encourage people with disabilities to see their lives as tragedies.
The view of disability as tragedy, for which the proper response is
pity, charity, or compensation, has been one of the major targets of
disability rights activists (and this is a campaign we endorse).130
But we also argue that it is important to disaggregate the various
ways in which disability can limit life’s pleasures. The law can
compensate for some of the negative results of disablement
without sending the message that disability is a tragedy; others
are at least in part endogenous to a society and a legal regime that
consistently send the message that disability is tragic.
In
particular, we contend that while tort law should compensate for
the physical pain, societal exclusion, and social stigma resulting
from disabling injuries, as well as for the cost of medical care,
assistive technology, and personal assistance, there should be no
recovery for hedonic losses believed to attend disability.
Our argument in this Part proceeds as follows. In Section
A, we confront a prominent argument against using the views of
people without disabilities to measure the degree to which
disability limits the enjoyment of life—the argument that adaptive
preferences, including the views of people with disabilities, may be
psychologically healthy but ought not to guide policy. We agree
that the views of people with disabilities reflect adaptive
preferences, but we argue that this recognition should start, not
end, the discussion. Whether the law should use as a standard the
(adaptive) preferences of people with disabilities, or instead the (in
some ways equally adaptive) preferences of people without
disabilities, depends on the consequences of incorporating each set
of preferences into policy.
In the succeeding sections, we identify two bad
consequences of incorporating into tort damages the nondisabled
perspective that disability inevitably limits enjoyment of life. In
Section B, we contend that a legal doctrine that disability
inevitably limits life’s enjoyment encourages paternalism and pity
and distracts political attention from efforts to change the social,
attitudinal, and physical barriers that make impairments
disabling. In Section C, we argue that such a doctrine also is likely

130 See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 427-428 (2000);
JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY : PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993).
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in many cases to harm individuals with disabilities by augmenting
the negative consequences of their injury.
We then turn to two other important normative
considerations. In Section D, we respond to a natural objection to
our argument—that measuring hedonic damages according to the
adaptive preferences of people with disabilities will lead to
undercompensation and underdeterrence. Finally, in Section E,
we consider the complex relationship between our argument and
the antipaternalist position of most disability rights activists.
A. Taking Adaptive Preferences Seriously
When people with disabilities experience their lives as just
as happy as those of people without disabilities, that experience
often results from hedonic adaptation. That is the import of the
studies discussed in Part II.A. Should we, then, disregard those
experiences? Professors John McKie, Peter Singer, Helga Kuhse,
and Jeff Richardson have argued, indeed, that public policy should
disregard the views individuals with disabilities hold about the
quality of their lives, if those views are the result of the
individuals’ having “adjust[ed] psychologically to their
condition.”131 But they offer no reason to disregard the experiences
of people with disabilities and use instead the experiences of
nondisabled people.
The assumed neutral baseline of nondisability is not, in fact, neutral; the preferences and experiences of
people without disabilities are just as conditioned by their
situations as are those of people with disabilities.132 Neither
people with nor those without disabilities have epistemic access to
the “true” enjoyment of life with a disability.133

131

MCKIE, ET AL., supra note 22, at 34.

Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, in
WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 91
(Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover, eds., 1995) (describing men’s
preferences to remain in a privileged position as being just as conditioned as
women’s preferences for their subordinated position). Richard Abel comes close to
arguing that there is simply no way to compare and assess the views of people
with disabilities against the views of people without them about disabled persons’
quality of life. See Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable,
Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 253, 277 (2006) (“Profound injury, like serious illness, transforms lives. But
though no one would choose to suffer the transformation, those different lives are
just that—different, neither better nor worse—incommensurable with each other
and incapable of being given a financial equivalent.”).
132

Cf. McCaffery, et al., supra note 20, at 1389 (arguing, for similar reasons,
that neither an ex ante nor an ex post perspective on non-pecuniary damages “is
more ‘accurate’ than the other”). This issue has some parallels in the debate
133
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This point stands in tension with one of the most prominent
discussions of adaptive preferences. Amartya Sen has argued that
a “blind or disabled” person should not be denied redistribution
simply because his “cheerful and resilient temperament” keeps
him from experiencing less happiness.134 Such a person, Sen
argued, “is really much more deprived [than others] in terms of
what he can do” and should not, because of his “buoyancy,” be
forced to “forgo the help that he could otherwise claim from the
society.”135 Sen is, of course, correct that disability limits available
modes of activity: By definition, mobility impairments impede
walking; visual impairments impede seeing; and so on. Still, the
language of “deprivation” is, to our minds, uncomfortably geared
towards a nondisabled baseline. Mobility via a wheelchair, for
example, can be much faster than walking;136 and blind people who
know Braille can read in the dark. More important, calling the
effect of disability a “real[]” deprivation does not change the point,
which we discuss below (and which has its own large literature)
that it is not physical impairments that limit activity but societal
choices that structure institutions in a way that excludes those
with impairments.137 A mobility impairment need not impede
getting to work, for example, if transportation and buildings are
wheelchair accessible. And of course Sen, who was not focusing on
the question we are considering, did not contend that there is such
a thing as “real” ontologically verifiable happiness.

regarding whether public or expert assessments of risk are correct. Those who
favor the experts’ assessments believe that the risk perceptions of the general
public are biased in a variety of ways; those who favor the public’s assessment
believe that nonexperts are not biased but simply have a richer theory of risk
than do the experts. For a discussion of this debate, see Bagenstos, ADA as Risk
Regulation, supra note 108, at 1485-1486; see also Dan M. Kahan & Donald
Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 150
(2006) (arguing that disputes like these are not empirical but instead reflect
“cultural commitments [that] are prior to factual beliefs on highly charged
political issues”).
134

SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 318.

SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES, AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3, at 318
(emphasis added); see also Nussbaum, Female Human Beings, supra note 132, at
91 (arguing we should not “rely on utility [measured by preference-satisfaction] as
our measure of life quality,” because of the phenomenon of adaptive preferences).
135

136 In marathons, for example, wheelchair racers routinely beat runners by
over a half hour. See, e.g., Frank Litsky, Marathon: Boston, Again, Belongs to
Kenyans, But This Time Americans Serve Notice, N.Y. TIMES (April 18, 2006)
(describing men’s running victor with course record time of 2 hours 7 minutes,
and wheelchair victor with time of 1 hour 25 minutes).
137

See infra text accompanying notes 142-152.
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Accordingly, the choice of frame for assessment of hedonic
damages cannot rest on the unexamined use of the word “real.”
Rather, it requires a normative determination of which views
would be best to credit.138 And that determination, we suggest,
requires an assessment of outcomes:
Which views, when
incorporated in policy, would lead to better consequences?
Awarding hedonic damages based on the view that disability
inevitably limits life’s enjoyment, we seek to show in the next two
sections, has bad consequences.
To be clear, we do not deny that disability causes harm,
even in the view of people with disabilities. What we deny is that
disability itself necessarily limits happiness. It should be clear
that disabling injuries typically require the injured person to pay
substantial out-of-pocket costs—for medical care, rehabilitation
services, assistive technologies, and personal assistance.139
138 See, e.g., Christine M. Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1542 (1998)
(whether “a person’s measure of welfare after (for example) becoming ill [is] the
appropriate measure of value” raises “a complex normative question”); Paul
Menzel et al., The Role of Adaptation to Disability and Disease in Health State
Valuation: A Preliminary Normative Analysis, 55 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2149, 2150
(2002) (stating that the question whether policy should incorporate the adaptive
views of people with disabilities and diseases regarding their quality of life “is a
fundamentally normative question”). This is a major point of Mark Kelman’s
recent work on the implications of hedonic psychology for welfarism, see Mark
Kelman, Hedonic Psychology and the Ambiguities of “Welfare,” 33 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 391, 410 (2005), work that elaborates on themes Kelman has been exploring
since Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 769; cf. Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 387, 401-421 (1981) (arguing that the notion of efficiency itself provides no
basis to decide whether to use offer or asking prices in cost-benefit analysis and
that therefore “the analyst will have to make a choice” based on some extrinsic
principle). The idea underlies Ellen Smith Pryor’s work, as well. In an argument
against what she terms the “insurance theory” of tort damages, Pryor has argued
that even if people with disabilities believe that the marginal utility of money is
higher pre-injury than post-injury (for example, if a “disabled person . . .
conclude[s] that money has been less valuable after injury, at least in part
because she has faced social and attitudinal barriers that have diminished the
uses of her money and the satisfaction she can garner from those uses), those
views cannot be a proper foundation for reduced compensation. Normatively,
Pryor argues, beliefs that are “the product of a social order that is unjustifiably
hostile and nonaccommodating to the disabled” should not be instantiated by the
legal system to further diminish opportunities for people with disabilities. Pryor,
supra note 75, at 119; id. at 145.
139 See Pryor, supra note 75, at 117 (discussing “the centrality of money to a
disabled lifestyle”); see also Bagenstos, Future of Disability, supra note 101, at 2526 (discussing the importance of, inter alia, assistive technology and personal
assistance to people with disabilities).
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Disabling injuries often also cause physical pain.140 Because of
hostile attitudes and our inaccessible environment, disability also
often leads to loss of opportunities to work and participate in
society.141
And the social stigma against disability may itself
inflict mental distress in people who have disabilities. The studies
discussed in Part II.A suggest that it is these social factors, and
not anything inherent in disability, that makes some people with
disabilities less happy. Courts can, therefore, award damages for
those disability-related injuries without endorsing the view that
disability inherently limits happiness—and we would urge them to
do so, in appropriate cases. Damages for lost enjoyment of life are
different, because of the negative consequences we detail below.
B. Encouraging Pity and Distracting Attention from Societal
Choices That Create Disability
As Part I demonstrated, hedonic damages cases are filled
with reasoning, arguments, and findings that endorse and
instantiate a view of disability as personal tragedy. That view is
very prevalent in our society. The standard narrative of disability
is one of “some terrible chance event which occurs at random to
unfortunate individuals.”142 In that narrative, disability is a
problem that resides in the individual with a disability. It is a
medical characteristic that should be fixed through health care
and rehabilitation if possible, and that should be compensated
with charity or public assistance if not.143
But disability rights activists have mounted a persuasive
challenge to that individualistic view. In their view (and ours),
disability is not “an inherent personal characteristic that should
ideally be fixed” but is instead “a characteristic that draws its
meaning from social context.”144 In particular, disability is what
occurs when a physical or mental condition interacts with social
structures and attitudes to create disadvantage. A person who
uses a wheelchair, in this view, is disabled only because so many
buildings, sidewalks, and modes of transportation are inaccessible,
and because so many people have negative attitudes toward people
For a good discussion of pain, see Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and
the Ineradicable Problems of Pain, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 245-257 (1991).
140

141

See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 419-425.

MICHAEL OLIVER, UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE
32 (1996).
142

143 For elaboration of this and some of the other ideas in this section, see
Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 427-432.
144

Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 427.
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who use wheelchairs. It is not the impairment that has disabled
her, but “the set of social choices that has created a built
environment that confines wheelchair users to their homes.”145
Disability rights activists have supported this “social
model” of disability in part because it seems to capture the true
nature of disability. As a “natural” matter, abilities lie on a
spectrum; it is social choices that make some limitations on some
abilities “disabling” and others not.146 And the social choices that
deprive people with certain impairments of opportunities are
everywhere you look: inaccessible buildings; work schedules that
are designed without taking account of the needs of some people
(e.g., people with diabetes) to take frequent short breaks; and the
“spread effect” in which people assume that an impairment limits
more functions, and more severely, than it actually does.147
But disability rights activists also support the social model
for more consequentialist reasons. When disability is seen as an
individual tragedy, the policy response is an individualized one
that focuses on the person with a disability. She must attempt to
get cured or rehabilitated—a process that may consume an
enormous amount of time and effort without ultimately achieving
much functional gain.148 If that fails, she must accept the charity
or welfare that goes with being a member of the “deserving poor”—
acceptance that stigmatizes her as less than a full citizen.149 And
in all events she is subject to the paternalistic control of
bureaucrats and professionals:
doctors, rehabilitation
professionals, welfare caseworkers, and so forth.150
The
individualistic approach thus removes very little of the
disadvantage attached to disability, and it in fact exacerbates that
disadvantage in a number of ways.
The social model, by contrast, directs attention not at the
individual with a disability but at the array of social choices that
create most of the disadvantage attached to disability. “Once one
145

Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 429.

See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES 87-91 (1983).
146

THE

SPECTRUM

OF

147 On the spread effect, see, for example, Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma,
supra note 115, at 423-424; BEATRICE A. WRIGHT, PHYSICAL DISABILITY—A
PSYCHOSOCIAL APPROACH 32-39 (2d ed. 1983).
148

See OLIVER, supra note 142, at 31-37.

149

See Bagenstos, Future of Disability Law, supra note 101, at 16-17.

See Bagenstos, Future of Disability Law, supra note 101, at 13-14;
Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 427.
150
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thinks of disability as arising primarily from the human
environment, rather than from anything inherent in an
individual’s physical or mental condition, it ‘becomes a problem of
social choice and meaning, a problem for which all onlookers are
responsible.’”151 The social model’s policy implications focus not on
rehabilitation or charity but on eliminating the physical, social,
and attitudinal barriers that make some physical and mental
impairments disabling. The Americans with Disabilities Act, with
its broad requirements of physical accessibility, reasonable
accommodation, and antidiscrimination, is a paradigmatic socialmodel policy response to disability.152
Hedonic damages doctrine that allows recovery on the basis
of the supposed intrinsic effect disability has on the enjoyment of
life implements and reinforces the individualistic theory that
disability rights advocates have persuasively argued against. The
juridical discourse in these cases treats disability as something
located in the individual rather than in society, something that in
and of itself has negative if not tragic effects, and something that
appropriately triggers a form of charitable largesse. Although the
psychological evidence suggests that social factors are key
contributors when people with disabilities experience enduring
hedonic harms,153 the current doctrine preempts interest in those
social factors. To the contrary, the lawyers’ advice and cases
discussed in Part I treat it as inevitable that a disability makes it
harder to enjoy life.
To illustrate the point, consider Nemmers v. United
States,154 one of the cases we cited in Part I. Nemmers was a
federal case about a boy, twelve years old at the time of trial, who
had been born with mental retardation and cerebral palsy as a
result of the defendants’ negligent obstetric care. The district
judge, Judge Michael Mihm, found the defendant liable, but he

151 Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 430 (quoting
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 48 (1990)).
152 See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 433-436. This
is not to say that the ADA entirely reflects the social model; in its definition of
disability in particular, it retains substantial aspects of the individualized
medical model. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Comparative Disability Employment
Law from an American Perspective, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 649, 657-659
(2003).
153

See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.

612 F. Supp. 928 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev’d, 795 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1986),
on remand, 681 F. Supp. 567 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
154
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summarily refused to award “quality of life” damages.155 The
Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook,
vacated that ruling and remanded.156 Judge Easterbrook analyzed
the claim for “quality of life” damages by focusing his attention on
the plaintiff’s introspective deficits. In a striking example of the
natural tendency to focus on one’s own perspective, Judge
Easterbrook wrote that a “reduction in the ability to appreciate
one’s own life, and to experience the lives of others through books,
is a real loss just as surely as pain and suffering is a real loss. Eric
does not suffer pain, but he will never live greatly.”157
On remand, Judge Mihm developed at some length all of
“the normal things of life” that the plaintiff’s evidence suggested
he could not do.158 He noted that Eric could not speak well,
“climb[] stairs or walk[] on rough terrain,” “hop or skip,” “feed[]
himself, car[e] for his own personal hygiene, or dress[].”159
Moreover, the plaintiff was “antisocial and . . . prone to throwing
fits both in private and in public,” although he “like[d] to swim and
bowl, and he enjoys riding a bicycle.”160 The result, Judge Mihm
found, was that the plaintiff “will never have the sense of
satisfaction, accomplishment, and enjoyment that comes from
reading a good book or walking alone in the woods,” and “likewise
will never experience the joy of marriage and creating a family of
his own.”161 Indeed, the judge said, “Eric will never be able to do

155

See Nemmers, 612 F. Supp. at 935.

156

See Nemmers, 795 F.2d at 634.

Id. Judge Easterbrook’s use of the phrase “live greatly” is a reference to a
famous speech by Justice Holmes, in which Holmes suggested that lawyers could
live a life of the mind:
157

The law is the calling of thinkers. But to those who believe with me that not
the least godlike of man’s activities is the large survey of causes, that to
know is no less than to feel, I say—and I say no longer with any doubt—that
a man may live greatly in the law as well as elsewhere; that there as well as
elsewhere his thought may find its unity in an infinite perspective; that
there as well as elsewhere he may wreak himself upon life, may drink the
bitter cup of heroism, may wear out his heart after the unattainable.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of Law (1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 29 (1920); see Francis A. Allen, Mr. Justice Holmes and “The Life of the
Mind,” 52 B.U. L. REV. 229 (1972). Of course, Judge Easterbrook’s statement also
echoes Mill’s comparison of a satisfied pig and an unsatisfied person. See MILL,
supra note 3, at 10.
158

Nemmers, 681 F. Supp. at 575.

159

Id. at 572-573.

160

Id. at 573.

161

Id.
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most of the normal things of life: the first date, parenting children,
reading, debating the politics of the day, etc.”162
Accordingly, Judge Mihm found an award of hedonic
damages to be appropriate.163 He concluded that damages would
benefit the plaintiff, since he was “mentally conscious (‘aware’ to
the extent that a person with an I.Q. of 45 can be aware), and
[was] capable of some narrow capacity to enjoy life.”164 In
particular, an award of $400,000 “could provide him consolation
and ease the burden of his condition by making available to him
‘things’ that would occupy his attention and make his life pass
more easily.”165 Some of those “things,” the judge suggested, might
include “a big screen television, or a special stereo system, or a
razzle dazzle birthday party (with a real magician pulling rabbits
out of a hat).”166
Nemmers is a perfect illustration of the medical/charitable
attitude that disability rights activists have mobilized against. We
have no doubt that Judge Mihm sincerely thought he was “doing
the right thing” by a poor, unfortunate plaintiff. His motives were
no doubt those of humanity and decency. But his vision of
disability was as a trait that is located in and inherently limits the
individual with a disability. Although he discussed at length the
activities the plaintiff supposedly could not perform because of his
disability, Judge Mihm seems to have both underestimated the
capacities of people with mental retardation and treated those
limitations as flowing naturally from the disability, rather than
contingently from social choices. We don’t know what Eric
Nemmers has, in the nearly 20 years since the final opinion in the
case, proved capable of.167 What we do know is that the judge’s
162

Id. at 575.

163

681 F. Supp. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted).

164

Id. at 576.

165

Id.

166

Id.

The underestimation of the potential of individuals with mental
retardation is widespread. Consider Nicholas Romeo, the plaintiff in Youngberg
v. Romeo, 357 U.S. 307 (1982). Romeo had what the Court characterized as
“profound[]” mental retardation, “with an I.Q. between 8 and 10.” Id. at 309. His
own counsel had conceded, “in light of the severe character of his retardation,”
that Romeo could never live outside of an institution. Id. at 317-318. Yet “ten
months after the Court’s decision, Nicholas Romeo moved to a community
residence in Philadelphia.” Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 393, 443 (1991). Eight years later,
Cook observed that “[s]ince April 1983, Romeo has been living, receiving services,
and working part-time in his neighborhood.” Id. Nicholas Romeo’s experience
167
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description seems extreme. An I.Q. of 45 is usually described as
“moderate” retardation.168
Characteristically, people in this
category can “learn self care, social, and vocational skills. Their
language is functional and they can achieve at least partial
independence.”169 They frequently can learn to read. People with
mental retardation and cerebral palsy—including people in the
relevant I.Q. range—certainly can date, and marry.170 And the
substantial self-advocacy movement among institutionalized and
formerly institutionalized people with mental retardation—who
have joined together in a national network of “People First”
organizations—shows that developmental disabilities hardly
prevent one from “debating the politics of the day.”171 The ability
of people with mental retardation to be good parents has also been
significantly underestimated.172 But far from addressing the social
choices and stereotypes that limited the plaintiff, the district court
uncritically endorsed them and offered only an infantilizing form
of charity. Instead of substitute pleasures like “razzle dazzle
birthday parties,” the ruling might have geared compensation
towards assistance with literacy, vocational training, independent
living, and parenting support. That, we contend, is the right
posture for courts to take in the disability rights era.
When lawyers ask for and courts make decisions like
Nemmers, they encourage feelings of pity toward people with
disabilities.173
They also divert attention from society’s
was typical of those who were released from Pennhurst, the institution where he
had been confined. See JAMES W. CONROY ET AL., THE PENNHURST LONGITUDINAL
STUDY: COMBINED REPORT OF FIVE YEARS OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS (1985).
See MARTHA A. FIELD & VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT FOR
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING AND RAISING CHILDREN 32-33 (1999).
168

169 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ARC, PREVALENCE
MENTAL RETARDATION (1982)).

OF

170 See, e.g., Amy Dockser Marcus, Next Chapter: A Young Woman With
Disabilities Plans Her Wedding, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2005.
171

See SHAPIRO, supra note 130, at 184-210.

See generally FIELD & SANCHEZ, supra note 168. Field and Sanchez cite
numerous studies on the subject, many of which included people in the same I.Q.
range as Eric Nemmers. Id. at 248-258.
172

Another example is Kansas City S. R. Co. v. Johnson, 798 So.2d 374
(Miss. 2001). There, the court stated that the plaintiff’s closed-head injury “left
him little more than a child,” id. at 377, and upheld an award for hedonic
damages in a discussion that was dripping with pity:
173

Perhaps most telling about the effects of the accident on
Johnson’s life is this testimony from Johnson’s daughter,
Angela: “I watched an active man sit in a wheelchair all day. I
watched an articulate man who took pride in his vocabulary
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contribution to the barriers that deny opportunities to people with
disabilities. Wendy Hensel has argued that the acceptance of
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions (in which children with
disabilities and their parents sue for the harm of being born)
reinforces the message that disability is “a status inherent in the
individual” and that the worth of a person with a disability is
“limited to the capability of current medical techniques to identify
and correct impairments.”174 A very similar effect is likely here.
Awarding damages for the out-of-pocket costs of medical
care, rehabilitation, assistive technology, and personal assistance
does not send such a negative message, however. Those damages
merely recognize concrete obstacles to physical health and
participation in the community that money can overcome. Indeed,
their very purpose is to enable the disabled plaintiff to participate
fully in the community. An award of damages to compensate for
the results of social stigma or the discriminatory denial of
opportunities would also avoid the negative message of current
damages practice. Damages cannot directly dispel stigma or end
discrimination, but they do represent an acknowledgement that
the limitations people with disabilities face are not inherent in the
disability but rather are the consequence of society’s reactions to
particular impairments. Awarding damages for the supposed
hedonic loss inherent in disability sends the opposite message,
that disability, in and of itself, makes one’s life less happy, and
that there is nothing society can do but take pity on those who are
disabled and throw some charity their way.
C. Debilitation
There is an additional reason to worry that awarding
hedonic damages for disability will actually harm the interests of
people with disabilities. To recover hedonic damages in a personal
injury suit, a plaintiff will often be called upon to testify that the
injury has made her life less enjoyable.175 But that very testimony
struggle to get one word out. And I have watched a person that
was always happy look sullen and sad, stare out into space.”
It is apparent that Johnson is no longer the person he
was prior to the accident. We hold today that these restrictions
are significant enough to warrant compensation as a separate
and distinct element of damages.
Id. at 381 (paragraph numbering omitted).
174

Hensel, supra note 123, at 181.

Plaintiffs’ counsel may seek to minimize the importance of the plaintiff’s
testimony, see supra note 33 and accompanying text, but the cases cited in Part
I.B. show that that testimony remains important in practice.
175

-43-

DRAFT—DO NOT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHORS

is itself likely to be debilitating. Such testimony, often derived
from the initial adjustment period during which disability typically
does affect happiness, may well reflect the plaintiff’s true feelings
about her life at the time of the trial. But by focusing on the
negative feelings that occur during that period, plaintiffs with
disabilities may delay or derail their ultimate ability to adapt to
their new condition; their testimony itself may disrupt the hedonic
adaptation process that ensures that most people’s happiness
rebounds after a negative event.176 The view that disability
inherently limits enjoyment of life may therefore become a selffulfilling prophesy: The fact that nondisabled jurors predictably
fail to appreciate hedonic adaptation encourages injured plaintiffs
(guided by their counsel) to present evidence that disability has
limited their ability to enjoy life.177 “Remedies inevitably shape
wants,”178 and “the legal process itself inevitably will be an
influence on the plaintiff’s ‘noneconomic’ losses.”179
Students of the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
system have reported a parallel phenomenon. To receive benefits,
SSDI claimants must prove that their disabilities make them
unable to perform any “substantial gainful activity.”180 The very
176 Ellen S. Pryor, Noneconomic Damages, Suffering, and the Role of the
Plaintiff’s Lawyer, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 563, 596 (2006) (citing studies showing that
writing or talking about a traumatic event may sometimes reduce experienced
suffering and grief, but that other times it will exacerbate the problem—
particularly “when ‘the rehearsals about an emotional experience extend over a
long period of time’”). Cf. Roger K. Pitman, Landy F. Sparr, Linda S. Saunders &
Alexander C. McFarlane, Legal Issues in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in
TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERIENCE ON MIND, BODY,
AND SOCIETY 378, 382 (Bessell A. van der Kolk et al. eds., 1996) (“Requiring the
PTSD patient to confront his or her traumatic history during interviews with
attorneys and consultants, depositions, and courtroom testimony thwarts
characteristic efforts at avoidance and predictably results in the resurgence of
intrusive ideation and increased arousal.”).
177 Some of the testimony these plaintiffs have offered about their
expectations of life seems strikingly bleak given the limited extent of their
disabilities. See, e.g., Overstreet v. Shoney’s, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 694, 717 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1999) (plaintiff whose left eye was injured, resulting in disfigurement and
loss of vision, testified that “she will not risk going rafting, canoeing, or playing
tennis,” and her husband testified that she “no longer wants to go out,” that, “she
bumps into people because she doesn’t see them coming on her left side, and that
“she hates going to work because she cannot tolerate the stress”); Varnell v.
Louisiana Tech Univ., 709 So.2d 890, 896 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (plaintiff who had
knee injury that required two surgeries “testified that with her physical
limitations and poor prognosis, she does not see that she has ‘much of a future’”).
178

Abel, supra note 132, at 259.

179

Pryor, Noneconomic Damages, supra note 176, at 564.

180

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
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effort to prove that inability, however, gives SSDI applicants a
powerful psychic investment in the proposition that they cannot
work.181 One commentator has accordingly concluded that “[t]he
very process by which disabled applicants become eligible for
benefits leads to learned states of helplessness.”182 And that is one
of the key reasons why virtually no one leaves the SSDI rolls—
people convince themselves that they cannot work, and their
testimony in their benefits applications becomes a self-fulfilling
prophesy.183 So too in the hedonic damages context, a newly
disabled person’s extensive efforts to prove that she can no longer
enjoy life may give her a powerful psychic investment in that
proposition.
The phenomenon also finds parallels in wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions. Because such actions grant compensation
“only to those [people with disabilities] willing to openly disavow
their self-worth and dignity,” Hensel has argued that even
individuals with disabilities who succeed in their suits “are likely
to feel abused and diminished rather than empowered and
vindicated.”184 And it is not just the plaintiffs and their children
who get the message that life with a disability is not worth living.
Other people with disabilities get the same message as well.185

181 See Richard V. Burkhauser, Lessons from the West German Approach to
Disability Policy, in DISABILITY AND WORK:
INCENTIVES, RIGHTS, AND
OPPORTUNITIES 85, 85 (Carolyn L. Weaver, ed., 1991).
182 Cheryl Rogers, The Employment Dilemma for Disabled Persons, in
IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 117, 122 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe,
eds., 1987); see also Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit:
Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535, 555
(1987-88) (“The [Social Security Act’s] definition of disability is in many ways a
negation of self-empowerment.”).
183

See Bagenstos, Future of Disability Law, supra note 101, at 32, 64.

184

Hensel, supra note 123, at 171-172.

See Hensel, supra note 123, at 174 (“Wrongful birth and life actions
transmit a potentially powerful message to all people with disabilities: as a
matter of law, your impairment, standing alone, is a sufficient basis upon which
to evaluate the quality of your life.”); see also Adrienne Asch, Reproductive
Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69, 94 (Sherrill
Cohen & Nadine Taub, eds., 1989) (“There is reason for us to fear wrongful birth
suits and to oppose suits for wrongful life: it is the message they send to the
children themselves, disabled people, and society about the worth of lives with
impairments”); Lori B. Andrews & Michelle Hibbert, Courts and Wrongful Birth:
Can Disability Itself Be Viewed as a Legal Wrong?, in AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND
INSTITUTIONS 318, 325 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, eds., 2000)
(similar).
185
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When courts declare that disability inherently limits the
ability to enjoy life, and thereby encourage plaintiffs with
disabilities to testify to that effect, they send a message that is
difficult for people with disabilities generally to ignore. True,
people with disabilities who are not plaintiffs may not come to
believe the courts’ view that disability does in fact reduce the
quality of their lives, and even plaintiffs whose adaptation is
delayed by their testimony seeking hedonic damages may
ultimately make the adjustment. But judicial decisions affirming
hedonic damages for disability powerfully reinforce the notion that
society treats people with disabilities as inherently having lives of
lower quality (and perhaps importance) than others.186
Damages that compensate for the out-of-pocket costs of
rehabilitation, assistive technology, or personal assistance would
not cause these disempowering effects; they are in fact means to
empowerment. And damages that compensate for stigma and
denial of opportunities are also empowering, because they
represent an official recognition that it is societal choices that
exclude people with disabilities, and that those choices are a wrong
that the government will address.187 But hedonic damages for
disability are as likely to cause as to compensate for hedonic harm.
D. The Undercompensation and Underdeterrence Objections
To this point, we have argued that courts should not award
damages for the limitations disability supposedly imposes on the
ability to enjoy life.
Such damages awards improperly
individualize the problems of disability. They focus attention on
the person with a disability and away from the social choices that
attach disadvantage to particular impairments. They may also
demoralize people with disabilities—both those individuals who
must testify as plaintiffs that disability does inherently limit their
ability to enjoy life, and other people with disabilities in the
broader community who get the message sent by these cases.
One might respond, however, that our proposal will lead to
undercompensation and underdeterrence. Even if many people
with disabilities find that their disabilities do not limit their
Cf. Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead Than Disabled? Should Courts
Recognize a “Wrongful Living” Cause of Action When Doctors Fail to Honor
Patients’ Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149, 217-220 (1997)
(arguing that “wrongful living” actions have this impact for similar reasons).
186

187 Cf. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, supra note 115, at 472-473
(advocating, for similar reasons, an approach to reading the ADA’s “disability”
definition that focuses on society’s perceptions of disability rather than anything
“inherent” in disability itself).
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ability to enjoy life, not all do. For those who do authentically
experience a loss of enjoyment of life, our proposal appears to deny
full compensation. From a deterrence perspective, one might
again wonder why the adaptive preferences of people with
disabilities should be taken seriously at all: Even if every person
with a disability adapted to his or her condition hedonically, surely
that does not mean that, ex ante, potential defendants should be
indifferent about whether they cause disabling injuries. Awarding
hedonic damages based on a view that disability inherently limits
life’s enjoyment might be thought to provide the necessary
deterrent signal to discourage acts that cause disabling injuries.188
We can offer a couple of responses to both the
undercompensation and the underdeterrence objections. First of
all, we do not propose to leave disabling injuries uncompensated.
To the contrary, under our proposal courts would award damages
for medical expenses, rehabilitation counseling, assistive
technology, and personal assistance, as well as for the economic
costs of society’s denial of opportunities to people with disabilities
and the abstract harm of social stigma. (It is worth recalling that
social factors like those for which our proposal would compensate
are the most important contributors to the hedonic loss
experienced by those people with disabilities who experience
hedonic loss.189) Some of these forms of damages are not typically
awarded for disabling injuries under current tort law. Our
argument therefore is not that courts currently award too much in
damages for disabling injuries (indeed, they may award too little)
but that they award the wrong damages. Under our proposal, total
compensation for disabling injuries—and thus the aggregate
deterrent signal against actions that cause disabling injuries—
might be as large as or even larger than under current law
More broadly, modern tort law is shot through with
doctrines rendering real harms non-compensable. For starters, in
some (though by no means all) situations in which a victim is no
longer able to receive compensation, modern tort doctrine
sacrifices deterrent goals. Thus wrongful death statutes offer only

188 See McCaffrey, et al., supra note 20, at 1397 (“Even if we believed that
the lower, ex post making whole value adequately compensated an injured
plaintiff once an injury had occurred, it does not follow that the damages faced by
putative defendants, for purposes of calibrating their ex ante incentives and
expressing society’s values, should also be set at this making whole level.”).
189

See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
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very limited damages;190 pain and suffering damages in some
jurisdictions do not survive the death of the plaintiff;191 and many
jurisdictions do not allow any recovery for lost enjoyment of life in
either wrongful death actions or where the plaintiff is unconscious
of the loss.192 As Rick Abel has argued, “If tort law excludes
significant damages because victims cannot be compensated, then
arguments for general damages grounded in corrective or
distributive justice lose some of their force.”193
Even where injured persons can receive compensation, it is
simply not the case that the law generally awards or should award
damages for all injuries caused by a wrongful injury. To the
contrary, as Robert Rabin has persuasively argued, “fidelity to the
goals of tort law, and more particularly to the compensation
objectives of accident law, does not require efforts to engage in
precisely contoured case-by-case implementation of a make-whole
principle.”194 One familiar example, made prominent by Judge
Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.,195 is often labeled the
“duty” rule; it holds that no damages are available for physical
injuries caused by the defendant’s negligence, if the defendant’s
conduct was foreseeably risky, ex ante, only with respect to

For a list of wrongful death statutes for all fifty states, see Andrew J.
McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of Wrongful Death
Damages, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1, 25–26 nn.129–31 (2005). The statutes allow only
limited liability; at common law, the rule was against any liability at all. Id. at
18–20; see also Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1043 (1965).
190

See, e.g., West’s Ann. Cal. C.C.P. § 377.34 (“In an action or proceeding by
a decedent’s personal representative or successor in interest on the decedent’s
cause of action, the damages recoverable are limited to the loss or damage that
the decedent sustained or incurred before death, including any penalties or
punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent would have been entitled to
recover had the decedent lived, and do not include damages for pain, suffering, or
disfigurement.”).
191

192 See cases from twenty states cited by the dissenting opinion in Choctaw
Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So.2d 911, 931 n.6 (Miss. 2000) (en banc, Cobb, J.,
dissenting); Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-69 (2003) (overruling majority decision in
Choctaw Maid Farm).
193

Abel, supra note 132, at 270.

Robert L. Rabin, Pain and Suffering and Beyond: Some Thoughts on
Recovery for Intangible Loss, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 359, 375 (2006); see also John
C.P. Goldberg, Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 435, 466-467 (2006) (arguing for a theory of “fair” rather than
“full” compensation, under which “a fact-finder might be entitled to award lessthan-fully compensatory damages, even to a not-at-fault tort plaintiff”).
194

195

162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).

-48-

DRAFT—DO NOT QUOTE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHORS

someone other than the plaintiff.196 Another doctrine perhaps
more closely related to the topic of this article governs negligent
infliction of emotional distress. Common law courts generally do
not award damages for emotional distress incurred when the
plaintiff witnesses someone else’s physical injury or narrowly
avoids such injury herself, unless the plaintiff herself was in the
“zone of danger” in which she was at risk of sustaining such an
injury.197 Other similar policy judgments abound: While damages
are available for the emotional toll wrought by the wrongful death
of a spouse or minor child, in many states there is no authorized
emotional distress recovery for wrongful death of an adult son or
daughter, or of the parent of an adult plaintiff, or of a sibling or
dear friend.198 These rules do not reflect a belief that people who
are outside of the zone of danger or whose adult children are
wrongfully killed never in fact experience emotional distress; nor
do they reflect a belief that such emotional distress is not in fact an
injury. Instead, they rest on a policy judgment that awarding
emotional distress damages in the specified circumstances would
create uncertain, and potentially limitless, liability, and, perhaps,
that it would unhelpfully encourage would-be claimants to dwell
on their traumas.199
Our argument, too, rests on a policy judgment, though one
of a different and perhaps even more defensible kind. Even if some
individuals who experience disabling injuries honestly find that
their conditions inherently limit their enjoyment of life, we believe
that awarding damages on that basis is on balance harmful to
people with disabilities—even those people with disabilities who
phenomenologically experience hedonic loss. If, for example,
damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress can be
limited out of a concern for fairness to people who negligently
196 See, e.g., Bryant v. Glastetter, 32 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (denying recovery to plaintiff tow truck operator killed after being
summoned by police to haul away defendant drunk driver’s car, notwithstanding
the defendant’s negligence with respect to earlier users of the road).
197 See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513 (Cal. 1963)
(applying the “zone of danger” rule); Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 924-925 (Cal.
1968) (allowing recovery for emotional trauma caused when mother witnessed the
death of her child as a result of defendant motorist’s negligence); Tobin v.
Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423 (N.Y. 1969) (disallowing recovery in similar
circumstances).
198 See, e.g., Weimer v. Wolf, 641 So.2d 480 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (discussing
evolution of Florida statutory law on this point); Stewart v. Price 718 So.2d 205,
209 (Fla. Ct. App. 1998) (same).

Cf. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 Va.
L. Rev. 1625, 1679-1682 (2002).
199
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cause harm, surely damages for disabling injuries can be limited
out of concern for people with disabilities themselves.
E. Of Paternalism
At this point, it is worthwhile to consider the relationship
between our argument and the antipaternalist position articulated
by most disability rights activists. As we suggested above,200
paternalism has historically been one of the most significant
contributors to the disadvantage people with disabilities
experience. Nondisabled parents, teachers, doctors, rehabilitation
counselors, employers, and others have arrogated to themselves
the prerogative to decide what is best for people with
disabilities.201 In so doing, they have deprived people with
disabilities of opportunities to work and participate in the
community.202 They have denied people with disabilities the
autonomy that consists in making one’s own choices. And they
have denied people with disabilities the “dignity of risk”—“the
opportunity to develop their skills, test them in the world, and
succeed or fail according to their talents.”203 Antipaternalism thus
has become one of the core tenets on which most disability rights
advocates agree.204
Our argument in this paper certainly draws on the
disability rights critique of paternalism. Against the historical
backdrop of paternalistic control over people with disabilities, the
judicial practice of awarding damages based on the hedonic harms
supposedly inherent in disability appears as yet another instance
of people without disabilities telling people with disabilities how
they should feel. Most people with disabilities do not feel that
their conditions limit their ability to enjoy life. But people without
disabilities tend not to see it that way. To embrace the view that
disability really lessens the enjoyment of life seems once again to

200

See supra note 150 and accompanying text.

For a discussion of the role of paternalism in disability oppression, see
JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND
EMPOWERMENT 52-55 (1998).
201

202 For an example, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73
(2002). For criticism of the Court’s decision in Echazabal, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, The Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Rational Discrimination, 55 ALA. L. REV. 923 (2004).

Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare
Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 997 (2003).
203

See id. at 1010-1012; Bagenstos, The Supreme Court, supra note 202, at
932 n.70.
204
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substitute the nondisabled public’s view of disability for that of
most people with disabilities.
Yet the matter is complicated, in a way that underscores
the analytical and normative limitations of a purely
antipaternalist position. At least some people with disabilities
hold what we have sometimes been calling the “nondisabled
view”—that disability does limit their ability to enjoy life. Under
our proposal, those individuals would not be able to recover
damages for their sincerely felt hedonic losses. To that extent, as
the discussion in the previous section highlights, our position itself
could reasonably be described as paternalist.205 We might defend
ourselves on the ground that when people with disabilities believe
they are less able to enjoy life, those beliefs are artifacts of the
adjustment period or are endogenous to a society that believes
disability inherently limits life’s enjoyment and a legal system that
encourages people with disabilities to testify that it does.206 But
then we would be making exactly the same move as do those who
would write off the positive hedonic experiences of most people
with disabilities. In the end, our argument must rest on the
consequences of using the adaptive preferences of most people with
disabilities as the basis for damages law: Using those preferences
avoids demoralization and puts the focus where it should be—on
society’s responsibility for the disadvantage attached to disability.
Paternalism is an individualistic concept, and our proposal
may be regarded as paternalistic in many individual cases. But
when disability rights activists talk about paternalism, they are
not simply challenging decisions to override the choices of
particular individuals with disabilities. They are also challenging
a system in which the views of most people with disabilities—that
disability is a trauma, not a tragedy; and that its disadvantages
are largely socially created—are written off as irrational and
illegitimate.207 In that respect, our position is very much in line
with the “antipaternalist” view espoused by disability rights
activists.
CONCLUSION
We have argued that courts should not award hedonic
damages for disabling injuries. Most people with disabilities find
205 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not
an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1171-1190 (2003) (arguing that
paternalism is inevitable).
206

See supra text accompanying notes 175-187.

207

See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 130, at 12-40.
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that their conditions do not limit their ability to enjoy life, though
most people without disabilities do not believe them.
Incorporating the views of people without disabilities in the law
distracts attention from the social choices that attach
disadvantage to disability, and it may itself inflict hedonic harm on
people with disabilities.
Our discussion has implications that extend well beyond
the disability or hedonic damages contexts, however. We have
highlighted an underappreciated complexity in the theory of
adaptive preferences. Adherents to that theory often write as if
identifying a preference as adaptive is dispositive of the question
whether that preference is a proper measure of justice or guide to
policy. As we have shown, matters are more complicated than
that. Identifying a preference as adaptive should be the beginning,
not the end, of the normative inquiry. Often, it will make sense to
disregard adaptive preferences. But the example of hedonic
damages and disability shows that, at least sometimes, it is more
just, and makes better policy, to take adaptive preferences
seriously.
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